



## **IDENTITY CA (IDCA) CERTIFICATION PRACTICE STATEMENT**

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## Document Control

This document shall be reviewed annually and an update by Sirar may occur earlier if internal or external influences affect its validity.

Digitally Signed Copy of this document shall be stored at Sirar's PKI Repository.

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Sirar, a subsidiary of the Saudi Telecommunications Company (STC) that owns and operates a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) under the Saudi National PKI. Sirar's PKI has core offerings of digital trust services designed to enable electronic signature and authentication services for business entities and individuals.

- STCS Identity Certificate Authority (IDCA) and
- STCS Qualified Certificate Authority (QUCA)

```

graph TD
    Root["Saudi National Root CA  
(2048 RSA)  
NCDC Operated"] --> Inter["STCS Intermediary CA  
(4096 RSA)"]
    Inter --- CP["STCS Intermediary CA CP"]
    Inter --- CPS["STCS Intermediary CA CPS"]
    Inter --- PDS["STCS Intermediary PDS"]
    Inter --> IDCA["STCS IDCA  
(4096 RSA)"]
    Inter --> QUCA["STCS QUCA  
(4096 RSA)"]
    IDCA --- IDCA_CP["STCS IDCA CP"]
    IDCA --- IDCA_CPS["STCS IDCA CPS"]
    IDCA --- IDCA_PDS["STCS IDCA PDS"]
    QUCA --- QUCA_CP["STCS QUCA CP"]
    QUCA --- QUCA_CPS["STCS QUCA CPS"]
    QUCA --- QUCA_PDS["STCS QUCA PDS"]
    IDCA --> Subscribers
    QUCA --> Subscribers
    subgraph Subscribers_Box [SUBSCRIBERS]
        direction LR
        S1["Subscriber Agreements"]
        S2["Subscriber Agreements"]
    end
    style Subscribers_Box stroke-dasharray: 5 5

```

### Figure 1-Sirar' PKI and Governance Hierarchy

This Certification Practice Statement (CPS) establishes the practices for the issuance, acceptance, maintenance, use, reliance upon, and revocation of digital certificates issued by the IDCA. This CPS establishes the processes and procedures the IDCA follows to:

- Issue Subscribers' certificates in compliance with the IDCA CP and this CPS,
- Manage certificate life cycle for the Subscriber certificates issued under this IDCA hierarchy; and
- Operate a directory of issued Subscriber certificates; and
- Operate the CRL directory.

This CPS complies with the following requirements:

- Saudi National PKI Policy,
- The IDCA CP,
- RFC3647 — Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework. Sections that are not applicable to the IDCA are labelled "No Stipulation". Where necessary, additional information is presented in subsections to the standard structure.,
- RFC5280 — Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile,
- Current version of the AICPA/CICA, WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities v2.2., and
- Adobe Approved Trust List (AATL) Certificate policies.

## **1.1 OVERVIEW**

This Certification Practice Statement (CPS) establishes the practices for the issuance, acceptance, maintenance, use, reliance upon, and revocation of digital certificates issued by the IDCA as governed by the IDCA Certificate Policy (hereinafter, the CP).

More specifically, this CPS describes the practices that the IDCA employs for:

Securely managing the core infrastructure hosting the IDCA, and Issuing, managing, revoking, renewing subscriber certificates,

- The technical, procedural and personnel management in accordance with the requirements of the IDCA CP.

Any use of or reference to this CPS outside the context of the IDCA and Saudi National PKI is completely at the using party's risk. The terms and provisions of IDCA CPS shall be interpreted under and governed by the IDCA CP and Sirar's Operations Policies and Procedures.

It is the responsibility of all parties applying for or using a Digital Certificate issued under the IDCA CPS, to read the CP to understand the practices established for the lifecycle management of the Certificates issued by the IDCA.

### **1.1.1 CERTIFICATE POLICY**

X.509 certificates issued by the IDCA to subscribers will contain a registered OID in the certificate policy extension that in turn shall be used by a Relying Party (RP) to decide whether a certificate is trusted for a particular purpose.

### **1.1.2 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CP AND THE CPS**

This CPS establishes the practices for the issuance, acceptance, maintenance, use, reliance upon, and revocation of digital certificates issued by IDCA as governed by the CP and related documents which describe IDCA requirements and use of Certificates.

### **1.1.3 INTERACTION WITH OTHER PKIs**

The IDCA will not directly interact with other external Certificate Authorities, it will only be chained to the STCS Intermediary CA.

### **1.1.4 SCOPE**

This CPS applies to all certificates issued by the IDCA. The IDCA operates under the Sirar's PKI hierarchy, maintained and operated by Sirar for issuance and management of certificates and revocation lists under the hierarchy.

## **1.2 DOCUMENT NAME AND IDENTIFICATION**

This document is the IDCA Certification Practice Statement (CPS), and is identified by the following object identifier (OID):

**OID: 2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.22**

## **1.3 PKI PARTICIPANTS**

The following are roles relevant to the administration and operation of the IDCA under the CPS.

Several parties constitute the participants of the IDCA. The parties mentioned hereunder including the Certification Authorities, Sirar's PKI committee, subscribers and relying parties are collectively called PKI participants.

### **1.3.1 CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES**

Sirar's PKI is an umbrella term referring to Sirar as an organization that runs PKI services under the Saudi National Root CA. Sirar's PKI implements a Two-tier PKI Architecture consisting of an offline intermediary CA (STCS intermediary CA), and two Issuing CA's under it, these being the STCS Identity CA (IDCA) and the QUCA. These Issuing CAs issue subscriber certificates, OCSP responder certificates and other certificates required by the internal PKI components. The Issuing CAs issue certificates to Subscribers in accordance with each respective CP and the CPS, their RA Agreement, Subscriber Agreement, Relying Party Agreement, and the Saudi National PKI Policy.

Sirar as an entity is responsible for:

- Control over the designation of CAs and RAs;
- Performance of all aspects of the services, operations and infrastructure related to the Sirar's PKI.
- Conduct regular internal security audits;
- Assist in audits conducted by or on behalf of NCDC; and

- Performance of all aspects of the services, operations and infrastructure related to the Sirar's PKI.

#### **1.3.1.1      *Saudi National Root CA***

The Saudi National Root CA is the trust anchor for the entire Saudi National PKI. It is self-signed CA and operated by NCDC.

#### **1.3.1.2      *STCS Intermediary CA***

The STCS Intermediary CA is an offline CA that is root signed by the Saudi National Root CA. It issues certificates to the Issuing CAs underneath in the Sirar's PKI hierarchy, including the IDCA.

#### **1.3.1.3      *STCS Identity CA (IDCA)***

The IDCA is an online Issuing CA that is signed by the STCS Intermediary CA, which in turn is root signed by the Saudi National Root CA. It issues authentication certificates used to identify subscribers. The subscribers can be individuals or organizational entities.

### **1.3.2   *REGISTRATION AUTHORITY (RA)***

Sirar runs its own RA function through Sirar, in addition, it also appoints third-party Registration Authorities (RAs) to perform the Subscriber Identification and Authentication and Certificate request and revocation functions defined in the CP, this CPS as well as the related documents.

The third-party Registration Authority (RA) is obligated to perform certain functions pursuant to an RA Agreement including the following:

- Process Certificate application requests in accordance with this CPS, the CP and applicable RA Agreement, and other policies and procedures regarding the Certificates issued;
- Maintain and process all supporting documentation related to the Certificate application process;
- Process Certificate Revocation requests in accordance with this CPS, the CP, applicable RA Agreement, and other relevant operational policies and procedures with respect to the Certificates issued. Without limitation to the generality of the foregoing, an RA shall request the revocation of any Certificate that it has approved for issuance according to the stipulations in this CPS;
- Comply with the provisions of its RA Agreement and the provisions of this CPS and the CPS including, without limitation to the generality of the foregoing, compliance with any compliance audit requirements; and
- Follow Sirar's Privacy Policy in accordance with this CPS, the CP and applicable RA Agreement.

### **1.3.3   *SUBSCRIBERS***

Subscribers are individuals (end users) or entities (organizations) to whom certificates are issued. Subscribers are bound by the conditions of use of certificates as contained in the

Subscriber Agreement. In general, the subscriber asserts that he or she uses the key and certificate in accordance with the CP and this CPS.

### **1.3.4     *RELYING PARTIES***

A Relying Party in this context is the entity that relies on the validity of the binding of the IDCA of an identity to a public key. The Relying Party is responsible for checking the validity of the certificate by examining the appropriate certificate status information, using validation services provided by the IDCA. A Relying Party's right to rely on a certificate issued under this CPS, requirements for reliance, and limitations thereon, are governed by the terms of the CP and the Relying Party Agreement.

Relying Parties can rely on a certificate that has been issued under this CPS if:

- The certificate has been used for the purpose for which it has been issued, as described in this CPS
- The Relying Party has verified the validity of the digital certificate, using procedures described in the Relying Party Agreement;
- The Relying Party has accepted and agreed to the Relying Party Agreement at the time of relying on the certificate; it shall be deemed to have done so by relying on the certificate; and
- The relying party accepts in totality, the certificate policy applicable to the certificate, which can be identified by reference of the certificate policy OID mentioned in the certificate.

### **1.3.5     *OTHER PARTICIPANTS***

#### **1.3.5.1     *Sirar's PKI Committee***

Sirar's PKI Committee (hereinafter, PKI Committee) operates as the governance function for Sirar's PKI. It groups the necessary functions for this purpose including the policy, compliance and design functions. The PKI Committee provides strategic direction and continuously supervises the PKI operations team. This committee are appointed by Sirar.

#### **1.3.5.2     *Sirar's Policy Authority (Sirar's PA)***

The Sirar's Policy Authority (Sirar's PA) is an assigned role responsible for the development, maintenance of the Sirar's PKI Policies, amongst other duties.

## **1.4     *CERTIFICATE USAGE***

### **1.4.1     *APPROPRIATE CERTIFICATE USES***

The IDCA issues Subscriber certificates used for Identification purposes. The certificates can be used to authenticate the subscriber to services and applications requiring the use of certificates as an additional method for authentication.

The IDCA issues certificates under this CPS only to those Subscribers who have signed their acceptance of a Subscriber Agreement in the appropriate form and whose application for certificates has been approved by the CA.

The following level of assurance are offered to subscribers in the form of end entity certificates issued by the IDCA. The Level of Assurance is in line with levels described in the Saudi National PKI Policy.

Assurance Level	Description of Assurance Level
Low Assurance Certificates	These certificates provide a low level of assurance to publicly available products and services. These certificates provide little confidence in the accuracy or legitimacy of the claimed identity. It requires a no or low level of binding between the claimed identity of the entity named in the certificate and the subscriber. It is intended for subscribers handling information of little or no value.
Medium Assurance Certificates	The certificates issued at this level provide medium confidence in the accuracy or legitimacy of the claimed identity. Identity assertions at this level are appropriate for transactions with serious or substantial consequences to Relying Parties. Identity at this level is verified with authoritative sources.
High Assurance Certificates	The certificates issued at this level provide high confidence in the accuracy or legitimacy of the claimed identity. It is intended of subscribers handling information of high value and that can have catastrophic consequences to Relying Parties. Identities at this level is verified with authoritative sources on the basis of a face to face or equivalent method.

For more information about the types and usage of the certificates issued by the IDCA, refer to Appendix-A of this document.

#### **1.4.2 PROHIBITED CERTIFICATE USES**

Subscribers are authorized to use their certificates for the purposes specified in section [1.4.1](#) of this document. The use of certificates for any other purposes is strictly prohibited.

### **1.5 POLICY ADMINISTRATION**

#### **1.5.1 ORGANIZATION ADMINISTERING THE DOCUMENT**

This CPS is administered by the Sirar's PA and approved by Sirar's PKI Committee. The chairperson of Sirar's PKI Committee signs-off on the approved documents by the PKI Committee.

### **1.5.2 CONTACT PERSON**

Queries regarding this CPS shall be directed at:

**Email: [PolicyAuthority@sirar.com.sa](mailto:PolicyAuthority@sirar.com.sa)**

**Telephone: 909**

Any formal notices required by this CPS shall be sent in accordance with the notification procedures specified in section [9.12.2](#) of this CPS.

### **1.5.3 PERSON DETERMINING CPS SUITABILITY FOR THE POLICY**

Sirar's PA is responsible for ensuring that this CPS conforms to the requirements of the CP in accordance with policies and procedures specified by Sirar's PKI. The PA shall ensure that the CPS, after ensuring conformity to the CP, is approved by Sirar's PKI Committee.

### **1.5.4 CPS APPROVAL PROCEDURES**

The CPS shall be effective upon approval by Sirar's PKI Committee. Procedure for approval and amendments are covered under section [9.12.1](#).

The approved changes shall be published as set forth in section [2.2.2](#).

## **1.6 DEFINITIONS AND ACRONYMS**

The terms used in this document shall have the meanings as defined in the prevailing CABForum Baseline Requirements ([www.cabforum.org](http://www.cabforum.org))



## **2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES**

### **2.1 REPOSITORIES**

Sirar publishes relevant certificates and the certificate status information (e.g. CRLs) about all digital certificates it issues in (an) online publicly accessible Certificate Dissemination Webpage at <https://sirar.com.sa/repository/> and is provided on a 24/7 basis.

### **2.2 PUBLICATION OF CERTIFICATION INFORMATION**

#### **2.2.1 PUBLICATION OF CERTIFICATES AND CERTIFICATE STATUS**

Sirar's PKI repositories that allow the PKI participants to make on-line enquiries regarding revocation and other certificate status information. IDCA provides PKI participants with information as part of the certificate on how to find the appropriate repository to check certificate status as well as how to find the appropriate OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) responder.

Sirar's PKI repositories contain the following PKI related elements:

- The IDCA certificate; and
- CRLs: CRLs that are made publicly available to allow PKI participants to verify the status of certificates.

The IDCA publishes the CRLs including any changes since the publication of the previous CRL, at regular intervals. The URL where a CRL is published is mentioned in section [7.1](#) as part of the certificate profile of each certificate file.

#### **2.2.2 PUBLICATION OF CA INFORMATION**

The CPS shall be made available to all IDCA PKI Participants at Sirar's Certificate Dissemination Webpage: <https://sirar.com.sa/repository/>. This Webpage is the only source for up-to-date documentation and IDCA reserves the right to publish newer versions of the documentation without prior notice.

Additionally, the IDCA publishes an approved, current and digitally signed version of this CPS.

#### **2.2.3 INTEROPERABILITY**

Repositories used to publish CA certificate and CRLs are based on standard HTTP distribution points.

### **2.3 TIME OR FREQUENCY OF PUBLICATION**

CRL publication is in accordance with section [4.9.7](#) of the CP. Other certificate status information is published in accordance with the provisions of this CPS.

Updates to this CPS are published in accordance with section [9.12.2](#).

This CPS and any subsequent changes should be made available to the participants as set forth in section [2.2.2](#) within two weeks of approval by Sirar's PKI Committee.

## **2.4 ACCESS CONTROLS ON REPOSITORIES**

Certificates and certificate status information in Sirar's PKI repository is made available to Sirar's PKI participants and other parties on a 24X7 basis as determined by the applicable agreements and Sirar's Privacy Policy, and subject to routine maintenance.

Sirar will protect repository information not intended for public dissemination or modification through the use of strong authentication, access controls, and an overall Information Security Management System that prevents unauthorized access to information.

The controls employed by Sirar shall prevent unauthorized persons from adding, deleting or modifying repository entries. Access restrictions shall be implemented on directory search to prevent misuse and unauthorized harvesting of information.

This CPS and the CP documents are provided as public documents and not subject to access control restrictions.

### **3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION**

#### **3.1 NAMING**

##### **3.1.1 TYPES OF NAMES**

Each Certificate must have a unique identifiable Distinguished Name (DN) according to the X.500 standard. Naming conventions for IDCA are approved by the Sirar's Policy authority, refer to section [7.1](#) where the naming conversions for different certificate types are specified.

##### **3.1.2 NEED FOR NAMES TO BE MEANINGFUL**

The subject name contained in certificates issued by the IDCA ensures association exists between the name and the entity to which it belongs.

The Distinguished name (DN) of certificates and CRLs issued under the IDCA shall have the Issuer field of set to the following (LDAP Notation):

CN=STCS IDCA, O=STCS, C=SA

The common name in the Subscriber DN will represent the Subscriber in a way that is easily understandable for humans. The certificate types supported by the IDCA are covered in Appendix-A of this document.

##### **3.1.3 ANONYMITY OR PSEUDONYMITY OF SUBSCRIBERS**

The IDCA is not issuing anonymous or pseudonymous certificates.

##### **3.1.4 RULES FOR INTERPRETING VARIOUS NAME FORMS**

IDCA shall only use Uniform Resource Indicators (URIs) in accordance with the applicable Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards. Subject Alternative Name forms are interpreted in accordance with applicable ISO and IETF Standards. The following table provides the rules for interpreting the various name forms.

<b>Name Form</b>	<b>Standard</b>
DN	X.500
URL	RFC-1738
Internet e-mail address	RFC-822
DNS	RFC-1034

##### **3.1.5 UNIQUENESS OF NAMES**

All distinguished names shall be unique across the IDCA. After a subscriber certificate expires or is revoked, the name can be re-used to re-issue a new certificate to the same subscriber.

The IDCA will be configured in such a manner as to enforce name uniqueness for certificates that it issues. The IDCA is responsible for ensuring name uniqueness in subscriber certificates

issued by it. Additional naming attributes for uniquely identifying the subject include serial number, email, etc.

### **3.1.6 RECOGNITION, AUTHENTICATION AND ROLE OF TRADEMARKS**

Certificate applicants are prohibited from using names in their certificate application that infringe upon the Intellectual Property Rights of others. The IDCA and its RAs, however, does not verify whether a certificate applicant has Intellectual Property Rights in the name appearing in a certificate application.

The IDCA may revoke a Certificate upon receipt of a properly authenticated order from NCDC, an arbitrator, or court of competent jurisdiction requiring the revocation of a Certificate or Certificates containing a Subject name in dispute.

## **3.2 INITIAL IDENTITY VALIDATION**

### **3.2.1 METHOD TO PROVE POSSESSION OF PRIVATE KEY**

For keys stored on cryptographic tokens, the generation of the keys is witnessed by the subscribers. The Private key corresponding to the certificate is held securely within the token and never leaves the protection mechanisms provided by the secure token. A self-signed PKCS#10 certificate signing request (CSR) is generated by the token for the IDCA.

Remote Signing keys are generated securely using Sirar's Remote Signing Platform. The Private key corresponding to the certificate is held securely within the Remote Signing Platform and never leaves it. A self-signed PKCS#10 certificate signing request (CSR) is generated by the token for the IDCA.

Software keys are generated using trustworthy computing equipment. If generated by the subscriber, the subscriber shall generate the keys in trustworthy systems and provide a self-signed certificate signing request in PKCS#10 format.

The IDCA inspects the contents of the CSR during the signing process and confirm that the details match those in the certificate application documentation. At minimum the following details shall be inspected to confirm the correctness thereof:

- Subject Distinguished Name (DN)
- Acceptable Key lengths and Algorithms
- The CSR is signed using the private key corresponding to the public key included in the CSR

### **3.2.2 AUTHENTICATION OF ORGANIZATION IDENTITY**

If the subject of the certificate is to include the organization's name or address of the organization, the IDCA or RA, as the case may be, shall verify the identity and address of the organization. The organization's address shall also be verified to confirm if it is the same address where the organization conducts its operation. The IDCA/RA shall verify these details using documentation provided by the applicant or verifying against any of the following:

- A government agency within the jurisdiction of the organization's legal existence or recognition;

- A third-party database that is periodically updated and considered a reliable data source
- A site visit by the IDCA/RA or third party who is acting on behalf of the CA; or
- An attestation letter written by a lawyer, a judge or other third party that is customarily relied upon for such information

For RA certificates, The CA or an RA shall verify the below details using documentation provided by the applicant:

- RA Details (Full Name, ID details, email address, phone)
- Requester Organization Information and address
- Subject of RA (DN) (optional)
- Sirar's Approval together with a signed RA Agreement

For more details on the collection and verification of information provided by the applicant, refer to Appendix-A that describes the processes based on the certificate type requirements defined by the IDCA.

### **3.2.3 IDENTITY-PROOFING OF INDIVIDUAL IDENTITY**

IDCA is responsible for the identification and authentication of Subscribers. This process is performed by the RAs. The RAs will ensure that the applicant's identity information is verified in accordance with the IDCA requirements defined in this CPS.

The RAs shall act in accordance with this CPS and all IDCA collateral documentation. In doing so, it will comply with the corresponding practices, procedures and policies described therein.

The type of authentication process to be followed will depend on the type of certificate applied for. IDCA offers three types of certificates:

- Low Level of Assurance Certificates – will verify email of the applicant
- Medium Level of Assurance Certificates – in addition to Low Level, requires a Government or National Issued Identity document
- High Level of Assurance Certificates – In addition to requirements in Medium Assurance also face to face or in-person verification. Other features such as biometrics are also verified.

Detailed requirements for the different certificate types are provided in Appendix-A in this document.

### **3.2.4 NON-VERIFIED SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION**

Non-verified information shouldn't include in certificates issued under IDCA, unless specifically mentioned in the Certificate Types section in Appendix-A of the CPS.

### **3.2.5 VALIDATION OF AUTHORITY**

The IDCA/RA shall, before certificate issuance, ensure that the applicant has specific rights, entitlements or permissions to obtain a certificate on behalf of the organization that is the subject of the certificate.

The following information shall be submitted by the applicant and verified by the IDCA or RA:

- Letter of authority from an authorized representative of the organization, giving permission to the applicant to apply for the certificate
- Proof of Identity (e.g. national Identity document) of the applicant.
- Email address of the applicant, if it is to be included, shall be verified
- Contact details in the letter of authority shall be provided and verified by communicating, via a reliable means, to confirm that the applicant represents the organization.

### **3.2.6 CRITERIA OF INTEROPERATION**

No stipulation.

## **3.3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY REQUESTS**

### **3.3.1 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR ROUTINE RE-KEY**

Subscribers are required to obtain new key pairs at least once every three years. (The usage periods for CA and Subscriber private keys are described in section [6.3.2](#).) During the Re-keying process the IDCA will create a new certificate with the same characteristics as the old certificate but with a new and different key pair and serial number. This new certificate may be given a new validity period or use the validity period that appeared in the old certificate.

When it has been less than three (3) years since the time the Subscriber was identified by the RA, the IDCA will authenticate an electronic request for a new certificate using the currently valid certificate issued to the Subscriber by the IDCA. If using the currently valid certificate is not applicable, then the identification and authentication steps for Re-Key would be the same as applied during initial certification.

Where it has been longer than three (3) years from the time that the Subscriber's identity has been authenticated, or if the user of existing certificate is not applicable, then the Subscriber certificate re-key will follow the same procedures as the initial certificate issuance process.

The routine re-key of the OCSP certificates is done according Sirar's internal Operations Policies and Procedures.

### **3.3.2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR RE-KEY AFTER REVOCATION**

If a Subscriber Certificate is revoked, the Subscriber goes through the same initial identity-proofing process as per respective certificate type to obtain a new certificate.

## **3.4 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR REVOCATION REQUESTS**

Prior to the revocation of a Subscriber certificate, the IDCA shall verify that the revocation has been requested by an entity authorized to request revocation.

Acceptable procedures for authenticating the revocation requests include:

- Having the Subscriber submit a Challenge Phrase (or the equivalent thereof), and revoking the Certificate automatically if it matches the Challenge Phrase (or the equivalent thereof) on record;
- Receiving a message from a Subscriber that requests revocation and contains a digital signature verifiable with reference to the Certificate to be revoked; or
- Communication with the requesting entity to provide reasonable assurances that the person or organization requesting revocation is who they claim to be. Such communication, depending on the circumstances, may include one or more of the following: telephone, facsimile, e-mail, postal mail, or courier service.

## **4 CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS**

### **4.1 CERTIFICATE APPLICATION**

The IDCA/RA performs the following steps when an applicant applies for a certificate:

- Establish the applicant's authorization to obtain a certificate;
- Establish and record the identity of the applicant; and
- Transmit to the IDCA a confirmation that the Applicant has met the authentication requirements and the information which is to appear in the Certificate.

The IDCA will perform the following steps when it receives the confirmation and certificate information from the RA:

- Verify that the transmission is from an authorized RA;
- Verify the private key ownership by the applicant. This can be achieved by verifying the signature and information in the PKCS#10 request.
- Generate the Certificate relating to that Applicant; and
- Transmits the Certificate to the Applicant and/or to the requesting RA.

Communication between the IDCA and the RA are authenticated and protected from modification and by requiring the CA and RA to validate the integrity and authenticity of the messages. These communications are transmitted via a secure protocol. Where shared secrets are transmitted electronically, these transmissions are conducted over encrypted channels using cryptographic mechanisms that are commensurate with the strength of the public/private key pair being used. Any out-of-band communications will protect the confidentiality and integrity of the data.

#### **4.1.1 WHO CAN SUBMIT A CERTIFICATE APPLICATION**

Either the Applicant or an individual authorized to request certificates on behalf of the Applicant can submit certificate requests. Applicants are responsible for any data that the Applicant or an agent of the Applicant supplies to the IDCA.

#### **4.1.2 ENROLLMENT PROCESS AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

Subscriber certificate applicants, including those applying for a device or entity certificate, will follow the application process specified in Appendix-A of this document, including complying with identity proofing requirements in section [3.2.3](#)

##### **4.1.2.1 Subscriber Certificates**

Subscriber certificate applicants shall agree to the terms of the Subscriber Agreement and undergo an enrollment process consisting of:

- Completing a Certificate Application and providing true and correct information;
- Providing identity proof and fulfilling the requirements of the applicable certificate type as defined in Appendix-A
- Generating, or arranging to have generated, a key pair;
- Delivering his/her public key to the RA; and



- Demonstrating possession of the private key corresponding to the public key delivered to the RA, as specified in section [3.2.1](#) of this CPS.

#### **4.1.2.2 RA Certificates**

An entity wishing to become RA under the IDCA shall agree to the terms of the RA Agreement as part of the application process. The RA applicants shall provide their credentials to demonstrate their identity and contact information during the application process. The private key for RA certificates shall be generated by the CA in accordance with the Operations Procedures.

All applicants shall agree to the terms and conditions of the applicable Agreement, such as: Subscriber Agreement, Relying Party or Registration Authority Agreement. Identification and Authentication process is described in the CPS under section [3](#).

#### **4.1.2.3 OCSP certificates**

the certification process is initiated by an authorized administrator under the supervision of the PKI Committee through a dedicated operational key ceremony documented by Sirar.

### **4.2 CERTIFICATE APPLICATION PROCESSING**

#### **4.2.1 PERFORMING IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FUNCTIONS**

RAs shall perform identification and authentication of all required Subscriber information as described in section [3.2.3](#) of this CPS.

#### **4.2.2 APPROVAL OR REJECTION OF CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS**

The IDCA/RA will approve an application for a subscriber certificate if the following criteria are met;

- Successful identification and authentication of all required Subscriber information as described in the Subscriber Agreement and outlined in section [3.2](#) of this CPS.

The IDCA/RA will reject a certificate application if:

- Identification and authentication of all required Subscriber information as described in the Subscriber Agreement cannot be completed;
- The Subscriber fails to furnish supporting documentation upon request;
- The Subscriber fails to respond to notices within a specified time; or
- The IDCA/RA believes that issuing a certificate to the Subscriber may bring the IDCA into disrepute.
- Policies specific to each certificate type have been detailed in the Certificate Types section in Appendix-A of this CPS.

For OCSP certificates, a certificate application is approved/rejected as part of the corresponding operational procedure.

### **4.2.3 TIME TO PROCESS CERTIFICATE APPLICATIONS**

Certification applications is processed within a commercially reasonable time in accordance with the CPS or any agreement signed with the PKI participants. The IDCA shall not be held liable for any processing delays initiated by the applicant or for events outside the CA's control.

## **4.3 CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE**

When the IDCA/RA receives a request for certificate from a Subscriber, the IDCA/RA will:

- Verify the identity of the Subscriber;
- Verify the authority of the requestor and the integrity of the information in the certificate request;
- Ensure the subscriber signs the Subscriber Agreement, and
- Verify that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to the certificate signing requests, for subscriber generated keys
- Submit the certificate request to the IDCA.

Upon receiving a validated certificate request from RA, the IDCA will create and sign the Subscriber certificate and deliver it to the Subscriber using a secure method.

All authorization and other attribute information received from an applicant are verified before inclusion in the certificate, unless such verification is not required for specific attributes, identifiers, and/or Certificate Types in Appendix-A of this CPS. The IDCA, through its IDCA/RA, is responsible for verifying the data to be included in the Certificate. At a minimum the IDCA/RA will follow the steps described in section [3.2](#) of the CP and this CPS.

### **4.3.1 CA ACTIONS DURING CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE**

Following successfully completion of the registration process, the IDCA will create and sign the subscriber certificate if all certificate requirements have been met and make the certificate available to the requesting party. The following actions shall be performed by the IDCA

- Verify the source and authenticity of the request
- Inspect the contents of the CSR to ensure accuracy
- Sign the certificate signing request
- Notify the requesting party of the availability of the certificate

### **4.3.2 NOTIFICATION TO SUBSCRIBER BY THE CA OF ISSUANCE OF CERTIFICATE**

Sirar notifies Subscribers, either directly or through the RA that they have created the Subscriber Certificate and provide Subscribers with access to the Certificates by notifying them, using the email address provided during application, that their Certificates are available. For in-person applications, notification may also take the form of verbal notification.

## **4.4 CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE**

### **4.4.1 CONDUCT CONSTITUTING CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE**

Certificate acceptance is governed by the agreements set out between the IDCA/RA and Applicants, any requirements imposed by the CP, this CPS and the relevant agreements under which the certificate is being issued.

The use of a Certificate or the reliance upon a Certificate signifies acceptance by that person of the terms and conditions of the CP, this CPS and applicable agreements by which they irrevocably agree to be bound.

### **4.4.2 PUBLICATION OF THE CERTIFICATE BY THE CA**

The CA does not publish end-user certificates apart from sharing it with the requester.

### **4.4.3 NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES**

No Stipulation.

## **4.5 KEY PAIR AND CERTIFICATE USAGE**

### **4.5.1 SUBSCRIBER PRIVATE KEY AND CERTIFICATE USAGE**

Subscribers may only use the Private key and associated public key contained in the certificate once accepted. The Subscribers shall only use their Private Keys for the purposes as contained in the certificate extensions such as key usage, extended key usage, certificate policies etc.

Subscribers shall protect their private keys from unauthorized use and shall discontinue use of private key(s) following expiration or revocation of the associated certificate.

### **4.5.2 RELYING PARTY PUBLIC KEY AND CERTIFICATE USAGE**

Relying parties shall accept the terms of the Relying Party Agreement as a condition for relying on any of the IDCA Issued certificates. Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the circumstances. If the circumstances indicate a need for additional assurances, the Relying Party must obtain such assurances for such reliance to be deemed reasonable. Before any act of reliance, Relying Parties shall independently assess:

- The appropriateness of the use of a Certificate for any given purpose and determine that the Certificate will, in fact, be used for an appropriate purpose that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by the CP. The Relying Party is solely responsible for assessing the appropriateness of the use of a Certificate;
- That the certificate is being used in accordance with the KeyUsage field extensions included in the certificate; and
- The status of the certificate and all the CA's in the chain that issued the certificate. If any of the Certificates in the Certificate Chain have been revoked, the Relying Party shall not rely on the certificate or shall make its own determination given any reasons furnished for such a revocation.

If the Relying Party deems that the use of the Certificate is appropriate, it shall utilize the appropriate software and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification or other cryptographic operations they wish to perform, as a condition of relying on Certificates in connection with each such operation. Such operations include identifying the Certificate Chain and verifying the digital signatures on all Certificates in the Certificate Chain.

## **4.6 CERTIFICATE RENEWAL**

Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate without changing the public key or any other information in the certificate. Certificate renewal is supported for IDCA issued certificates to Subscribers.

### **4.6.1 CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CERTIFICATE RENEWAL**

Certificate renewal is supported for the IDCA issued certificates subject to the following conditions:

- The certificate to be renewed must not have been revoked;
- All details of the certificate remain accurate and no new validation of identity is required

### **4.6.2 WHO MAY REQUEST CERTIFICATE RENEWAL**

The IDCA may accept a request for renewal of certificates from the original holder of the certificate. Such requests shall be validated using mechanisms such as challenge response. The request for renewal may originate from the following:

- An RA for its own RA certificate
- An RA on behalf of a subscriber
- A subscriber for his own individual certificate
- An authorized representative for an Organizational certificate.

### **4.6.3 PROCESSING CERTIFICATE RENEWAL REQUESTS**

The IDCA processes the certificate renewal after confirming the authenticity of such a request. The validation may reuse the original documentation used during first issuance. IDCA may request additional information before the certificate renewal request may be performed. Such request will be processed as soon as is commercially reasonable to do so.

Should the validation fail, the certificate shall not be renewed. The subscriber has the option to apply for a new certificate, and such application shall follow the applicable procedures for a new certificate application.

### **4.6.4 NOTIFICATION OF RENEWED CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE**

The IDCA notifies the subscriber of the renewed certificate using the same method as that of original issuance.

### **4.6.5 CONDUCT CONSTITUTING ACCEPTANCE OF A RENEWAL CERTIFICATE**

Acceptance procedures for renewed certificate shall follow the same conditions as the original certificate acceptance.

#### **4.6.6 PUBLICATION OF A RENEWAL CERTIFICATE**

Refer to section [4.4.2](#).

#### **4.6.7 NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES**

Generally, IDCA does not notify other entities of a renewed certificate apart from the requesting party.

### **4.7 CERTIFICATE RE-KEY**

Re-keying a certificate (key update) refers to the issuance of new certificate with a different key pair and serial number while retaining other subject information from old certificate.

The new Certificate may have the same expiry date as the old certificate and may be signed using a different Issuing CA private key.

#### **4.7.1 CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CERTIFICATE RE-KEY**

Certificate re-key may happen while the certificate is still active, after it has expired, or after a revocation. The re-key operation shall invalidate any existing active certificates of the same type.

#### **4.7.2 WHO CAN REQUEST A CERTIFICATE RE-KEY**

Certificate re-key may be requested by:

- The PKI Committee for any corrective action (Subscriber to be notified)
- An RA for its own RA certificate
- An RA on behalf of a subscriber, if requested by the subscriber
- A subscriber for his own individual certificate
- An authorized representative for an Organizational certificate.

#### **4.7.3 PROCESSING CERTIFICATE RE-KEYING REQUESTS**

The IDCA shall follow procedures to ensure that the person or organization seeking to update an end-user Subscriber Certificate is in fact the Subscriber, a sponsor of a device or a representative of an entity. Acceptable procedures are through the use of a Challenge Phrase (or the equivalent thereof), or proof of possession of the private key.

Other than the above-mentioned procedures, the IDCA/RA shall reconfirm the identity of the Subscriber in accordance with the requirements specified in section [3.3.1](#) of this CPS for the authentication of an original Certificate Application.

#### **4.7.4 NOTIFICATION OF NEW CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE TO SUBSCRIBER**

Notification of issuance of a re-keyed certificate to Relying Parties follow the same procedures as notification for newly issued Subscriber certificates.

#### **4.7.5 CONDUCT CONSTITUTING ACCEPTANCE OF A RE-KEYED CERTIFICATE**

Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate is in accordance with section [4.4.1](#).

#### **4.7.6 PUBLICATION OF THE RE-KEYED CERTIFICATE BY THE CA**

Refer to section [4.4.2](#).

#### **4.7.7 NOTIFICATION OF CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE BY THE CA TO OTHER ENTITIES**

Generally, the IDCA does not notify other entities of a re-keyed certificate apart from the requesting party.

### **4.8 CERTIFICATE MODIFICATION**

The IDCA does not support any form of subscriber certificate modification. Should the subscriber wish to change details of an existing certificate the following shall apply:

- The existing certificate shall be revoked
- The new details requested shall be verified including the confirmation of the identity information of the subscriber
- Once the information is successfully validated a new certificate shall be issued the same way a new certificate is issued or through the re-key process.

### **4.9 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION AND SUSPENSION**

A Certificate shall be revoked when the binding between the Subject and the Subject's Public Key defined within a Certificate is no longer considered valid.

The IDCA/RA will notify subscribers of certificate revocation using any or all of the below methods:

- Access to the CRL at the Sirar's PKI repository;
- Email notification to subscriber (Such notification is deemed complete, once the email is sent by the IDCA to the subscriber's registered email address); or
- Telephonic notification to subscriber.

The IDCA will notify other participants of certificate revocation through access to the CRL and the OCSP responder.

#### **4.9.1 CIRCUMSTANCE FOR REVOCATION OF A CERTIFICATE**

The IDCA shall revoke Certificates of Subscribers for the following non-exhaustive reasons:

- A Subscriber contravened any provisions of the Saudi e-Transactions Act and Bylaws made there under;
- The Subscriber has failed to meet its obligations under this CPS or any other applicable Agreements, regulations, or laws;
- IDCA suspects or determines that revocation of a Certificate is in the best interest of the integrity of the CA;

- The IDCA determines that a Certificate was not issued correctly in accordance with this CPS;
- There has been an improper or faulty issuance of a certificate due to:
  - A material prerequisite to the issuance of the Certificate not being satisfied;
  - A material fact in the issued certificate is known, or reasonably believed, to be false.
- The Subscriber of the certificate asks for his/her certificate to be revoked due to:
  - The Subscriber's private key is suspected to be compromised;
  - The cryptographic storage device of the Subscriber is lost or stolen;
  - If the Subscriber no longer wishes to use the certificate.
- Subscriber or another authorized agent asks for his/her certificate to be revoked;
- If the Subscriber is no longer part of the organization, i.e., affiliation to the organization is no longer valid; and
- The Subscriber agreement, or Registration Authority's Agreement in the case of an RA, has been terminated.

Whenever any of the above circumstances occur, the associated certificate shall be revoked and placed on a CRL and/or specified as revoked by an OCSP Responder.

#### **4.9.2 WHO CAN REQUEST REVOCATION OF A CERTIFICATE**

The following entities can request revocation of a certificate:

- NCDC can request the revocation of any certificates issued by any CA participating in the Saudi National PKI;
- The PKI Committee can request the revocation of any certificates issued under its authority;
- An RA can request the revocation of any of their Subscribers Certificate;
- The RA for their own certificate, if any suspected misuse has been attributed to their given Certificates;
- Subscribers, if any suspected misuse has been attributed to their given Certificates, can request a revocation; and
- A legal, judicial or regulatory agency in Saudi Arabia, can request certificate revocation, within applicable laws and in coordination with NCDC.

#### **4.9.3 PROCEDURE FOR REVOCATION REQUEST**

A request to revoke a certificate shall identify the certificate to be revoked, explain the reason for revocation, and allow the request to be authenticated (e.g., digitally or manually signed). The IDCA authenticates the request as well as the authorization of the requester in accordance with the applicable Agreements.

#### **4.9.3.1      *Procedure for Requesting the Revocation of a Subscriber Certificate***

The request for a subscriber certificate revocation is authenticated as described in section [3.4](#) of this CPS. The subscriber (or any authorized party) can follow an online or a manual process to request the revocation.

Upon successful authentication, the certificate shall be revoked and placed on a CRL which shall be issued in accordance with section [4.9.7](#) of this CPS while the OCSP Responder will be updated accordingly.

#### **4.9.3.2      *Procedure for Requesting the Revocation of an RA Certificate***

An RA requesting revocation of its RA certificate is required to communicate the request to the PKI Committee. The Committee – after following provisions in the relevant RA Agreement, Operations Policies or Procedures – approve the revocation. The Committee may also initiate the revocation of an RA certificate if it is deemed to be necessary or in the best interest of the IDCA.

Upon approval, the RA certificate shall be revoked and placed on a CRL which shall be issued in accordance with section [4.9.7](#) of this CPS while the OCSP Responder will be updated accordingly.

#### **4.9.4      *REVOCATION REQUEST GRACE PERIOD***

Revocation request grace period is not permitted once a revocation request has been verified.

#### **4.9.5      *TIME WITHIN WHICH CA MUST PROCESS THE REVOCATION REQUEST***

The IDCA processes authorized revocation requests within a commercially reasonable time.

#### **4.9.6      *REVOCATION CHECKING REQUIREMENTS FOR RELYING PARTIES***

Relying Parties are required to comply with the Relying Party Agreement requirements for signature validation, which prescribe how certificate status information is to be obtained and used. Relying Parties may check Certificate status by consulting the most recent CRL from the CA that issued the Certificate on which the Relying Party wishes to rely upon. The CA provides Relying Parties with information on how to find the appropriate CRL, repository, and the OCSP responder to check for revocation status

#### **4.9.7      *CRL ISSUANCE FREQUENCY***

The IDCA publishes CRLs at regular intervals. The following rules apply for the CRLs issued by the IDCA:

- CRLs are refreshed every 24 hours;
- CRLs lifetime (i.e. value of the nextUpdate field) is set to 25 hours



#### **4.9.8 MAXIMUM LATENCY OF CRLs**

CRLs are issued timely by the IDCA as per the CRL issuance frequency listed in section [4.9.7](#) of this CPS.

#### **4.9.9 ONLINE REVOCATION CHECKING AVAILABILITY**

The OCSP service shall be available 24 hours a day with reasonable time allocated to maintenance.

#### **4.9.10 ONLINE REVOCATION CHECKING REQUIREMENTS**

The IDCA provides an Online revocation and status checking to its relying parties. The IDCA shall update information provided via OCSP every 24 hours. The OCSP responses from this service expires in 25 hours.

The OCSP requests contains the following data:

- Protocol Version
- Service request
- Target certificate identifier

#### **4.9.11 OTHER FORMS OF REVOCATION ADVERTISEMENTS AVAILABLE**

No other forms of revocation advertisements is provided other than the CRL and OCSP services.

#### **4.9.12 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO KEY COMPROMISE**

No stipulation, refer to section [4.9.1](#)

#### **4.9.13 CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CERTIFICATE SUSPENSION**

Certificate suspension is not supported by the IDCA

#### **4.9.14 WHO CAN REQUEST SUSPENSION**

Not applicable.

#### **4.9.15 PROCEDURE FOR SUSPENSION REQUEST**

Not applicable.

#### **4.9.16 LIMITS ON SUSPENSION PERIOD**

Not applicable.

## **4.10 CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICES**

Refer to section [4.9.6](#).

### **4.10.1 OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS**

CRLs are published by on a public repository which is available to relying parties through HTTP protocol queries.

The OCSP responder exposes an HTTP interface accessible to relying parties.

### **4.10.2 SERVICE AVAILABILITY**

The Sirar's PKI repository, including the latest CRL, should be available 24X7 for at least 99% of the time.

## **4.11 END OF SUBSCRIPTION**

Subscribers may end their subscription to certificate services by having their subscriber certificate revoked or letting it expire naturally.

## **4.12 KEY ESCROW AND RECOVERY**

The IDCA does not support Subscriber Key Escrow.

## **5 FACILITY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS**

### **5.1 PHYSICAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

Sirar's PKI is hosted at Sirar's data center, with appropriate physical and procedural access controls for all hardware and software sub-systems used in the issuance and revocation of certificates. Sirar limits access to functions critical to registration and certificate to personnel in Trusted Roles.

Sirar enforces physical and environmental security policies for systems used for certificate issuance and management which cover physical access control, natural disaster protection, fire safety factors, failure of supporting utilities (e.g. power, telecommunications), structure collapse, plumbing leaks, protection against theft, breaking & entering, and disaster recovery. Controls should be implemented to avoid loss, damage or compromise of assets and interruption to business activities and theft of information and information processing facilities.

#### **5.1.1 SITE LOCATION AND CONSTRUCTION**

The location and construction of the facility enforces the IDCA and Sirar's Data Center equipment is consistent with facilities used to house high value, sensitive information. The site location and construction, when combined with other physical security protection mechanisms such as guards and intrusion sensors, provides robust protection against unauthorized access to the IDCA equipment and records.

#### **5.1.2 PHYSICAL ACCESS**

IDCA systems are protected by at least four tiers of physical security, with access to the lower tier required before gaining access to the higher tier. Progressively restrictive physical access privileges control access to each tier. Sensitive IDCA operational activity, any activity related to the lifecycle of the certification process such as authentication, verification, and issuance, occur within very restrictive physical tiers. Physical access is automatically logged, and video recorded. Additional tiers enforce individual access control through the use of biometric authentication. Unescorted personnel, including un-trusted employees or visitors, should not be allowed into such secured areas. Sirar employ Security Personnel that continually monitor the facility hosting CA equipment on a 24x7 basis. Sirar shall provide normal and emergency lighting to the CA facilities.

Sirar ensures that the facilities used for the Issuing CA Certificate life cycle management are operated in an environment that physically protects the services from Compromise through unauthorized access to systems or data. An authorized employee should always accompany any unauthorized person entering a physically secured area. Physical protections should be achieved through the creation of clearly defined security perimeters (i.e. physical barriers) around the systems hosting the Sirar's PKI operations. No parts of the Sirar's PKI premises shall be shared with other organizations within this perimeter.

#### **5.1.3 POWER AND AIR CONDITIONING**

Sirar shall ensure that the power and air conditioning facilities are sufficient to support the PKI Operations environment.

The IDCA equipment shall have backup capability sufficient to automatically lockout input, finish any pending actions, and record the state of the equipment before lack of power or air conditioning causes a shutdown. Any of the IDCA on-line servers (e.g., CAs hosting servers)

shall be provided with Uninterrupted Power sufficient to support a smooth shutdown of the PKI operations.

#### **5.1.4      *WATER EXPOSURE***

Sirar ensures that the IDCA systems are protected from exposure to water sources. Additional prevention mechanisms such as using raised flooring must be employed where possible to minimize flood water damaging equipment.

#### **5.1.5      *FIRE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION***

The IDCA equipment is housed in a facility with appropriate fire suppression and protection systems.

#### **5.1.6      *MEDIA STORAGE***

Sirar ensures that IDCA media is stored so as to protect it from accidental damage (such as water, fire, electromagnetic, etc.). Media that contains audit, archive or backup information is duplicated and stored in a location separate from the CAs.

#### **5.1.7      *WASTE DISPOSAL***

Sensitive media and documentation that are no longer needed for operations are destroyed using appropriate disposal processes.

#### **5.1.8      *OFF-SITE BACKUP***

Full system backups of CAs, sufficient to recover from system failure, are made on a periodic schedule as described in Sirar's Operations Policies and Procedures.

### **5.2      *PROCEDURAL CONTROLS***

#### **5.2.1      *TRUSTED ROLES***

A trusted role is one whose incumbent performs functions that can introduce security problems if not carried out properly, whether accidentally or maliciously. The people selected to fill these roles must be extraordinarily responsible or the integrity of the PKI is weakened. The functions performed in these roles form the basis of trust for all uses of the IDCA. The following are the trusted roles for Sirar's PKI:

- CA Administrator – general CA administration and approval of the generation and revocation of certificates
- CA Security Officer – overall responsibility for administering the implementation of the CA's security practices, cryptographic key lifecycle management functions
- Policy Authority – responsible for the overall development, maintenance and ensures approval of CA policies
- Operations Authority – responsible for the implementation of the CA policies and development of operational procedures and guidelines

- CA Auditor – internal auditor is responsible for ensuring the CA is operating in line with approved policies and procedures. The auditor is also responsible for checking that procedures are being followed correctly during Key Ceremonies
- CA Key Manager – responsible for CA Key Lifecycle management functions
- CA Key Shareholders – holders of the CA key components

### **5.2.2     *NUMBER OF PERSONS REQUIRED PER TASK***

Sirar shall ensure separation of duties for critical CA functions to prevent one person from maliciously using the PKI systems without detection. Each user's system access is limited to those actions for which they are required to perform in fulfilling their responsibilities. Separate individual shall fill each of the roles specified in the Governance and Operating Model document. This provides the maximum security and affords the opportunity for the greatest degree of checks and balances over the system operation.

A single person may be sufficient to perform tasks associated with a role, except for the activation of the IDCA certificate signing Private Key. Activation of the IDCA certificate signing Private Key shall require at least 3 people to present their credentials.

### **5.2.3     *IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION FOR EACH ROLE***

Before exercising the responsibilities of a trusted role:

- Sirar shall confirm the identity of the employee by carrying out background checks.
- Sirar shall issue an access card to administrators who need to access equipment located in the secure enclave.
- Sirar shall provide the necessary credentials that allow administrators to conduct their functions.

### **5.2.4     *SEPARATION OF ROLES***

Individual CA personnel are specifically designated to the roles defined in section 5.2.1 of this CPS and the Governance and Operating Model document. The IDCA will ensure that no individual shall be assigned more than one Trusted Role.

## **5.3     PERSONNEL CONTROLS**

### **5.3.1   *BACKGROUND, QUALIFICATIONS AND EXPERIENCE REQUIREMENTS***

All persons filling trusted roles shall be selected on the basis of skills, experience, loyalty, trustworthiness, and integrity. The requirements governing the qualifications, selection and oversight of individuals who operate, manage, oversee, and audit the IDCA are set forth in the Governance and Operating Model document.

### **5.3.2   *BACKGROUND CHECK AND CLEARANCE PROCEDURES***

Sirar conducts background investigations for all Sirar's PKI personnel including trusted roles and management positions. Background check shall take into account the following:

- Availability of satisfactory character reference, i.e. one business and one personal;
- A check (for completeness and accuracy) of the applicant's CV;

- Confirmation of claimed academic and professional qualifications;
- Independent identity check (National ID card, Passport or similar document);
- Interviews with references shall be done as required; and
- More detailed checks, such as criminal record checks.

Security clearance is repeated every 3 years for personnel holding trusted roles. All persons filling the Trusted Roles shall only be granted access to Sirar's PKI systems once the background clearance procedures detailed above have been completed and confirmed.

### **5.3.3     *TRAINING REQUIREMENTS***

Sirar shall ensure that all personnel receive appropriate training. Such training shall address relevant topics such as basic Public Key Infrastructure knowledge, security requirements, operational responsibilities and associated procedures.

### **5.3.4     *RETRAINING FREQUENCY AND REQUIREMENTS***

Individuals responsible for PKI roles are made aware of changes in the CA operation. Any significant change to the operations shall have a training (awareness) plan, and the execution of such plan shall be documented.

The IDCA reviews and update its training program at least once a year to accommodate changes in the CA system.

### **5.3.5     *JOB ROTATION FREQUENCY AND SEQUENCE***

The IDCA ensures that any change in the staff complement will not affect the operational effectiveness of the PKI services and security thereof.

### **5.3.6     *SANCTIONS FOR UNAUTHORIZED ACTIONS***

Sirar takes appropriate administrative and disciplinary actions against personnel who perform unauthorized actions (i.e., not permitted by the CP, CPS and/or other procedures) involving the IDCA or the Sirar's PKI repository .

### **5.3.7     *CONTRACTING PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS***

Contractor personnel employed to perform functions pertaining to Sirar's PKI Operations shall be subjected to the same processes, sanctions, assessment, security and operational procedure as permanent personnel. under adequate supervision and perform only assigned tasks.

### **5.3.8     *DOCUMENTATION SUPPLIED TO PERSONNEL***

Sirar makes available to its personnel the CP, CPS, and any relevant documents required to perform their duties.

## 5.4 AUDIT LOGGING PROCEDURES

Audit log files are generated for all events relating to the security of the IDCA, and other associated components. The security audit logs for each auditable event defined in this section are maintained in accordance with onsite retention period and for archive.

### 5.4.1 TYPES OF EVENTS RECORDED

The PKI Committee shall ensure recording in audit log files all events relating to the security of the CA system hosted in Sirar's data centre. All security audit capabilities of the CA operating system and CA applications shall be enabled. Such events include, but are not limited to:

1. CA key lifecycle management events, including:
  - a. Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival, and destruction; and
  - b. Cryptographic device lifecycle management events.
2. Issuing CA Certificate lifecycle management events, including:
  - a. Certificate requests, renewal, and re-key requests, and revocation;
  - b. All verification activities stipulated in these Requirements and the Issuing CA's Certification Practice Statement;
  - c. Date, time, phone number used, persons spoken to, and end results of verification telephone calls;
  - d. Acceptance and rejection of certificate requests;
  - e. Issuance of Certificates; and
  - f. Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists.
3. Security events, including:
  - a. Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts;
  - b. PKI and security system actions performed;
  - c. Security profile changes;
  - d. System crashes, hardware failures, and other anomalies;
  - e. Firewall and router activities; and
  - f. Entries to and exits from Sirar's PKI facility.
  - g. Equipment failure or electrical power outages
  - h. Changes to CA configuration and system clock time

Log entries MUST include the following elements:

- Date and time of entry;
- Identity of the person making the journal entry; and
- Description of the entry.

All logs, whether electronic or manual, must contain the date and time of the event and the identity of the Entity which caused the event. The CA shall also collect, either electronically or manually, security information not generated by the CA system such as:

- Physical access logs;

- System configuration changes and maintenance;
- CA personnel changes;
- documentation relating to certificate requests and the verification;
- documentation relating to certificate revocation;
- Discrepancy and No compromise reports;
- Information concerning the destruction of sensitive information;
- Current and past versions of all Certificate Policies;
- Current and past versions of Certification Practice Statements;
- Vulnerability Assessment Reports;
- Threat and Risk Assessment Reports;
- Compliance Inspection Reports; and
- Current and past versions of Agreements.

#### **5.4.2      *FREQUENCY FOR PROCESSING AND ARCHIVING AUDIT LOGS***

The PKI Committee ensures that designated personnel review log files at regular intervals to validate log integrity and ensure timely identification of anomalous events. At a minimum, the following audit log review cycle is implemented by the PKI Committee:

- IDCA application and security audit logs shall be reviewed by the security operations team daily, as part of the regular daily operations
- On a monthly basis, PKI operations management reviews the applications and systems logs to validate the integrity of the logging processes and to test/confirm the daily monitoring function is being operated properly
- On a quarterly basis, PKI operation management reviews the physical access logs and the user management on the IDCA systems with an objective to continuously validate the on-going physical and logical access policies
- Every six (6) months, the internal audit and compliance function executes an internal audit of the IDCA operations.
- Evidence of audit log reviews, outcome of the review process, and executed remediation actions are collected and archived.

#### **5.4.3      *RETENTION PERIOD FOR AUDIT LOG***

Sirar retains all system generated (electronic and manual) audit records onsite for a period not less than twelve months from the date of creation.

#### **5.4.4      *PROTECTION OF AUDIT LOG***

Sirar protects the electronic audit log system and audit information captured electronically or manually from unauthorized viewing, modification, deletion or destruction.



#### **5.4.5     *AUDIT LOG BACKUP PROCEDURES***

Sirar backs up all audit logs and audit summaries in a secure location and protected to the same degree as the originals.

#### **5.4.6     *AUDIT COLLECTION SYSTEM (INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL)***

The audit log or journal is an integral part of the CA software. The audit system ensures the integrity of the audit data being collected. In case of the audit system stopping to function, the IDCA shall determine whether to suspend or continue with operations.

#### **5.4.7     *NOTIFICATION TO EVENT-CAUSING SUBJECT***

Event-causing subject are not notified.

#### **5.4.8     *VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS***

Routine vulnerability assessments of security controls shall be performed by Sirar for its Issuing CAs and other PKI supporting systems hosted in Sirar's data centre. Such assessments shall be held at least annually.

Sirar's security program includes an annual Risk Assessment which includes identification of foreseeable internal and external threats, assess the likelihood and potential damage of these threats and assess the sufficiency of the policies, procedures, information systems and technology. The program also ensures vulnerability assessments are performed, reviewed and revised following an examination of audit events.

Based on the Risk Assessment exercise, Sirar shall develop, implement, and maintain a security plan to control the risks identified during the Risk Assessment, commensurate with the sensitivity of the Certificate Data and Certificate Management Processes.

### **5.5     RECORDS ARCHIVAL**

#### **5.5.1     *TYPES OF EVENTS ARCHIVED***

The IDCA archive records shall be sufficiently detailed to establish the proper operation of the CA, or the validity of any certificate (including those revoked or expired) issued by the CA. The IDCA shall make these archived records available to its Qualified Auditor upon request. The data to be archived may include, but not limited to the following:

- Audit data, as specified in section [5.4](#)
- Data related to certificate requests, verifications, issuances and revocations
- CA Procedures, policies, subscriber agreements and compliance records
- Cryptographic device and key lifecycle information
- Systems management and change control activities

#### **5.5.2     *RETENTION PERIOD FOR ARCHIVE***

The minimum retention periods for archive data are established in accordance with applicable regulatory guidance, laws, Agreements, and as specified by the PKI Committee. IDCA's minimum retention period for archive data is established at ten (10) years.

The IDCA shall retain all documentation relating to the IDCA certificate requests and the verification thereof, and all Certificates and revocation thereof, for at least ten (10) years after any Certificate based on that documentation ceases to be valid.

### **5.5.3     *PROTECTION OF ARCHIVE***

Only authorized individuals shall be permitted to review the archive. The contents of the archive shall not be released except as determined by NCDIC, Sirar's PKI Committee, or as required by law. Records and material information relevant to use of, and reliance on, a certificate shall be archived. Archive media shall be stored in a secure storage facility separate from the original storage media. Any secondary site must provide adequate protection from environmental threats such as temperature, humidity and magnetism. Data to be migrated periodically to fresh media; and protection against obsolescence of hardware, operating systems, and other software, by, for example, retaining as part of the archive the hardware, operating systems, and/or other software in order to permit access to and use of archived records over time.

### **5.5.4     *ARCHIVE BACKUP PROCEDURES***

Only one copy of the archive is maintained. In other words, archive itself is not backed up.

### **5.5.5     *REQUIREMENTS FOR TIME-STAMPING OF RECORDS***

Certificates, CRLs, and other revocation database entries shall contain time and date information. System logs shall be time stamped and systems use a dedicated time server to maintain synchronized time.

### **5.5.6     *ARCHIVE COLLECTION SYSTEM (INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL)***

Only authorized and authenticated staff shall be allowed to access archived material. PKI operations team use a dedicated backup, restore and archive procedures that describe how the archive information is created, transmitted and stored involving the archive collection systems.

### **5.5.7     *PROCEDURES TO OBTAIN AND VERIFY ARCHIVE INFORMATION***

Only authorized IDCA personnel with a clear hierarchical control and a definite job description may obtain and verify archive information. Sirar retains records in electronic or in paper-based format.

## **5.6     KEY CHANGEOVER**

The CA system utilized by the IDCA may periodically perform key rollover, allowing CA keys to be changed periodically as required to minimize risk to the integrity of the IDCA. Once changed the new key is used for certificate signing purposes. The unexpired older keys are used to sign CRL's until all certificates signed by the unexpired older private key have expired. The old key shall be protected to the same degree as the active key.

## **5.7 COMPROMISE AND DISASTER RECOVERY**

### **5.7.1 INCIDENT AND COMPROMISE HANDLING PROCEDURES**

If Sirar detects a potential hacking attempt or other form of compromise to the CA, it shall perform an investigation in order to determine the nature and the degree of damage. If the IDCA Private key is suspected of compromise, the procedures outlined in Sirar's Incident Management Procedures shall be followed. Otherwise, the scope of potential damage shall be assessed in order to determine if the IDCA needs to be rebuilt, only some certificates need to be revoked, and/or the CA key needs to be declared compromised.

The IDCA invokes its Incident Management Procedures in the event of the following non-exhaustive events:

- Suspected or detected compromise of the CA system;
- Physical or electronic attempts to penetrate the CA system;
- Denial of Service attacks on a CA system component; and
- Any incident preventing the CA from issuing a CRL within 24 hours of the time specified in the next update field of its currently valid CRL.

### **5.7.2 COMPUTING RESOURCES, SOFTWARE, AND/OR DATA ARE CORRUPTED**

The IDCA maintains backup copies of hardware, system, databases, and private keys in order to rebuild the IDCA capability in case of software and/or data corruption. If necessary, the procedures as outlined in the Sirar's Operations Policy and Business Continuity Plan shall be enacted.

### **5.7.3 CA PRIVATE KEY COMPROMISE RECOVERY PROCEDURES**

The IDCA maintains a Disaster Recovery Policies and Procedures. The recovery procedures shall contain procedures for the recovery of the CA private key, and same shall be followed in the case of the IDCA Private Key compromise.

### **5.7.4 BUSINESS CONTINUITY CAPABILITIES AFTER A DISASTER**

Sirar has developed a robust Business Continuity Management System for critical PKI services to provide the minimum acceptable level of assurance to its subscriber for service availability.

All Sirar's critical infrastructure equipment at the primary site (Sirar's data center) have built-in hardware fault-tolerance and configured to be highly available with auto-failover switching. Sirar currently maintains copies of backup media and infrastructure system software, which include but are not limited to PKI services related critical data, database records for all certificates issued and audit related data at its offsite business continuity and disaster recovery storage facilities.

Sirar's Business Continuity Management System (BCMS) demonstrates the capability to restore critical PKI services at the disaster recovery site according to the following Recovery Time Objective (RTO):

- Repository (CRL and OCSP): 8 hours,
- Certificate Issuing Capability: 24 hours,

- Invoicing Capability: 72 hours.

Sirar has developed a business continuity plan to mitigate the effects of any kind of natural, man-made or equipment failure related disaster. The business continuity plan is being regularly tested, verified, and updated to be operational to address crisis situation in the event of a disruption. For security reasons details of this plan are not publicly available.

Sirar's business continuity plan includes:

- Conditions for activating the plan;
- Emergency procedures;
- Fall-back procedures;
- Resumption procedures;
- A maintenance schedule for the plan;
- Awareness and education requirements;
- The responsibilities of the individuals;
- Recovery time objective (RTO);
- Recovery point objective (RPO);
- Regular testing of contingency plans;
- The CA's plan to maintain or restore the CA's business operations in a timely manner following interruption to or failure of critical business processes;
- A requirement to store critical cryptographic materials (i.e., secure cryptographic device and activation materials) at an alternate location;
- Acceptable system outage and recovery time;
- Procedure/frequency of backup copies for essential business information and software are taken; and
- Procedures for securing its facility to the extent possible during the period of time following a disaster and prior to restoring a secure environment either at the original or a remote site.

### **5.7.5 CA TERMINATION**

When it is necessary to terminate the IDCA, the impact of the termination must be minimized as much as possible in light of the prevailing circumstances and is subject to the applicable IDCA Agreements. Procedures to be followed for the termination of the IDCA shall be developed, and must at a minimum include the following:

- Ensure minimal disruption caused by the termination of the CA
- Ensure notification of Subscribers, Relying Parties and other relevant Stakeholders, such as the NCDC
- Ensure certificate status information services are provided and maintained for the duration of the termination
- Ensure process for revoking certificates are maintained

Sirar shall nominate a custodian of the IDCA archival records in case of the termination of Sirar's PKI.

Should a successor CA be appointed to take over the functions of the IDCA, such a successor shall, to the extent as it is practical and reasonable, assume the same rights, obligations and duties as the terminated IDCA.

#### **5.7.6 RA TERMINATION**

In the event of Sirar terminating an RA, the termination shall be done in such a way to minimize the impact of the termination to the subscribers. Procedures for the termination of the RA shall be developed and shall at minimum address the following:

- Ensure minimal disruption caused by the termination of the RA
- Ensure notification of Subscribers, Relying Parties and other relevant Stakeholders
- Ensure process for revoking certificates are maintained

Sirar ensures certificate records maintained by the terminated RA are kept secure and available.

## **6 TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS**

### **6.1 KEY PAIR GENERATION AND INSTALLATION**

#### **6.1.1 KEY PAIR GENERATION**

Key pair generation for IDCA will be witnessed and attested to by a party separate from the IDCA operator or the CA administrator as mentioned in the Key Generation Script for each CA.

Key Pair generation must be performed using trustworthy systems and processes that provide the required cryptographic strength of the generated keys, and prevent the loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of such keys. Sirar's PKI CAs shall use Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) for CA key generation and storage. HSM's should be minimum FIPS 140-2 Level 3 validated.

IDCA key pair generation is performed by multiple trusted personnel using trustworthy systems and processes that provide security and required cryptographic strength for the generated keys.

The IDCA and Issuing CAs key pair is generated in pre-planned Key Generation Ceremony in accordance with the requirements of NCDL. The activities performed during the Key Generation Ceremony are video recorded, dated and signed by all individuals involved. These records are kept for audit and tracking purposes for a length of time deemed appropriate by Sirar's PKI management.

For Subscriber and RA Private keys generated in cryptographic hardware, the key pairs will be generated or protected, as the case may be, in cryptographic modules at least compliant to FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher. Keypairs generated in Software shall be generated using trustworthy computer systems.

#### **6.1.2 PRIVATE KEY DELIVERY TO SUBSCRIBERS**

For keys stored on cryptographic tokens, Sirar delivers subscriber private keys in a secure format, such as in cryptographic tokens or smartcards when those keys are generated in cryptographic hardware.

Subscriber and RA keys generated in Software is delivered securely using secure standards such as PKCS#12 file format, where the following requirements are met:

- Anyone who generates a private signing key for a Subscriber does not retain any copy of the key after delivery of the private key to the Subscriber (in case of local signing where the subscriber keys are stored on smartcards or tokens);
- The private key is protected from activation, compromise, or modification during the delivery process;
- The Subscriber acknowledges receipt of the private key (in case of local signing where the subscriber keys are stored on smartcards or tokens);
- Delivery is accomplished in a way that ensures that the correct smartcard or token and activation data are provided to the correct Subscriber.
  - For cryptographic modules, accountability by the RA for the location and state of the module is maintained until the Subscriber accepts possession of it.

- For electronic delivery of private keys, the key material is encrypted using a cryptographic algorithm and key size at least as strong as the private key. Activation data is delivered using a separate secure channel.

### **6.1.3 PUBLIC KEY DELIVERY TO CERTIFICATE ISSUER**

Public keys can be delivered to the IDCA using standard secured delivery processes (e.g., PKCS#10 through e-mail or media exchange) and key management protocols (e.g., XKMS, PKIX CMP, SCEP, ...).

### **6.1.4 CA PUBLIC KEY DELIVERY TO RELYING PARTIES**

The IDCA Public Key is delivered to the Relying Parties by making it available as set forth in section [2.2.1](#).

### **6.1.5 KEY SIZES**

Key pairs shall be of sufficient length to prevent others from determining the key pair's private key using cryptanalysis during the period of expected utilization of such key pairs. Key sizes are described as below for all subscriber certificates issued by the IDCA. All FIPS-approved signature algorithms shall be considered acceptable. If NDCD determines that the security of a particular algorithm may be compromised, it shall direct Sirar to revoke the affected certificates.

All certificates issued to subscribers shall use at least 2048-bit RSA, with Secure Hash Algorithm version 2 (SHA-256) in accordance with FIPS 186-2 or equivalent.

The key lengths of certificates issued by the IDCA are as follows:

- Subscriber Key Pairs: 2048 bits RSA
- RA Key Pairs: 2048 bits RSA
- OCSP Key Pair: 2048 bits RSA

### **6.1.6 PUBLIC KEY PARAMETERS GENERATION AND QUALITY CHECKING**

The IDCA shall generate key pairs that comply with FIPS 186. The IDCA shall use reasonable techniques to validate the suitability of the Subscriber key pairs.

### **6.1.7 KEY USAGE PURPOSES**

Certificates issued to subscribers contain a key usage extension depending on their intended business usage in accordance with RFC 5280. Refer to section [7.1](#) and [7.3](#) of this CPS.

## **6.2 PRIVATE KEY PROTECTION AND CRYPTO-MODULE ENGINEERING CONTROLS**

### **6.2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE STANDARDS AND CONTROLS**

Cryptographic modules, smartcards or tokens employed for subscriber, OCSP Responder and RA private key protection issued by the IDCA shall comply with FIPS-PUB 140-2 "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", Level 3 and above.

**6.2.2 SUBSCRIBER PRIVATE KEY MULTI-PERSON CONTROL**

No stipulation. RAs, OCSP Responder and subscribers' private keys are not under multi-person control.

**6.2.3 PRIVATE KEY ESCROW**

The IDCA does not escrow Subscriber Private keys as it does not issue encryption certificates.

**6.2.4 PRIVATE KEY BACKUP**

The IDCA does not backup Subscriber private keys.

**6.2.5 PRIVATE KEY ARCHIVAL**

The IDCA does not offer data encryption services, thus does not support the archival of Private Keys.

**6.2.6 PRIVATE KEY TRANSFER INTO OR FROM A CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE**

The IDCA does not permit subscriber key transfer into and out of cryptographic modules or devices. Subscriber keys are generated in secure cryptographic devices and shall not be transferred out of those devices.

**6.2.7 PRIVATE KEY STORAGE ON CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE**

The subscriber keys are allowed to be stored in at least FIPS 140-2 level 2 compliant devices in encrypted form except for the low-assurance certificates where key is stored in software-based containers.

**6.2.8 METHOD OF ACTIVATING PRIVATE KEYS**

Subscriber Private keys is activated by providing a passphrase set on initial certificate generation by the subscriber.

**6.2.9 METHODS OF DEACTIVATING PRIVATE KEYS**

Subscriber private keys that have been activated shall not be left unattended. Subscribers are obliged to deactivate the private key by "logging out" of the cryptographic device or automatically after a period of inactivity as configured.

**6.2.10 METHODS OF DESTROYING PRIVATE KEYS**

**For the Subscribers keys stored on hardware security device like smart card / tokens:**

The subscriber shall delete their keys and certificates from the device using the appropriate vendor's provided software. Alternatively, the subscriber can re-initialize their hardware token to destroy all its contents.



**For the Subscribers keys stored on software-based containers:**

The subscriber shall delete the content of the software-based container using the vendor's provided instructions. Alternatively, the subscriber can securely delete the files storing the data of the software-based container.

**6.2.11 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE RATING**

As described in section [6.2.1](#).

**6.3 OTHER ASPECTS OF KEY PAIR MANAGEMENT****6.3.1 PUBLIC KEY ARCHIVE**

The subscriber public key is archived as part of the certificate archive process.

**6.3.2 CERTIFICATE OPERATIONAL PERIODS AND KEY USAGE PERIODS**

The table below details key usage, length and certificate lifetime for the corresponding keys:

Key/Certificate	Key Length in Bits	Maximum Validity Period
Subscriber keys	2048	36 months
RA keys	2048	36 months
OCSP Signing Key	2048	36 months

**6.4 ACTIVATION DATA****6.4.1 ACTIVATION DATA GENERATION AND INSTALLATION**

The activation data used to unlock subscriber private keys, in conjunction with any other access control, shall have an appropriate level of strength for the keys or data to be protected. Activation data shall be user selected.

**6.4.2 ACTIVATION DATA PROTECTION**

The RA, OCSP responder or Subscriber shall protect activation data from disclosure or compromise. If written down, it shall be secured at the level of the data that the associated cryptographic device is used to protect and shall not be stored with the cryptographic device.

**6.4.3 OTHER ASPECTS OF ACTIVATION DATA**

No stipulation.

## **6.5 COMPUTER SECURITY CONTROLS**

### **6.5.1 *SPECIFIC COMPUTER SECURITY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS***

The computer security functions may be provided by the operating system, or through a combination of operating system, software, and physical safeguards.

At a minimum Sirar's data centre shall have (but not limited to) the following controls to ensure security of the systems:

- Integrity checks are performed on the operating system;
- Software packages are only installed from a trusted software repository;
- Minimal network connectivity;
- Authentication and authorization for all functions;
- Strong authentication and role-based access control for all vital functions;
- Disk and file encryption for all relevant data; and
- Proactive patch management.

### **6.5.2 *COMPUTER SECURITY RATING***

The IDCA Software complies with at least Common Criteria EAL2 or an equivalent security profile from other applicable standards.

## **6.6 LIFE-CYCLE SECURITY CONTROLS**

### **6.6.1 *SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT CONTROLS***

Purchased hardware or software are shipped in a sealed, tamper-proof container, and installed by qualified personnel.

Hardware and software updates shall be procured in the same manner as the original equipment.

Dedicated trusted personnel are involved in implementing the required Infrastructure CA configuration according to the documented operational procedures.

The IDCA hardware and software are tested, deployed, and configured in accordance with industry leading development and change management practices.

### **6.6.2 *SECURITY MANAGEMENT CONTROLS***

A configuration management process is enforced to ensure that the IDCA systems configuration, modification and upgrades are documented and controlled by the PKI operations management. A vulnerability management process is enforced to ensure that the IDCA equipment is scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically thereafter. The vulnerability management process prioritizes the processing of critical vulnerabilities not previously met by the Infrastructure operations team.

### **6.6.3     *LIFE CYCLE SECURITY RATINGS***

No Stipulation.

## **6.7     NETWORK SECURITY CONTROLS**

Sirar employs appropriate security measures to ensure they are guarded against denial of service and intrusion attacks. Such protection mechanisms may include network security and firewall management, port restrictions and IP address filtering. Unused services shall be turned off.

Any boundary control devices used to protect the network on which PKI equipment is hosted shall deny all but the necessary services to the PKI equipment.

## **6.8     TIME STAMPING**

Time stamping shall be supported for the Certificates, CRLs, and other revocation database entries containing time and date information. The CA components are synchronized with a trusted time source being a Network Time Protocol (NTP) service.

## 7 CERTIFICATE, CRL AND OCSP PROFILES

### 7.1 CERTIFICATE PROFILE

#### Medium Assurance Identity Certificate

Field / x.509 extension	Value or Value Constant	Critical
Version	2 (Version 3)	V1 Field
SerialNumber	At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.	V1 Field
Signature	SHA256 with RSA Encryption	V1 Field
Issuer	CN = STCS IDCA O = STCS C = SA	V1 Field
NotBefore	Certificate generation process date/time.	V1 Field
NotAfter	Certificate generation process date/time + Up to 36 months (3 years)	V1 Field
Subject	"CN=<English-Firstname> <English-Secondname> <English-Thirdname> <English-Lastname> <Arabic-Lastname> <Arabic-Thirdname> <Arabic-SecondName> <Arabic-FirstName> <Organization Name>,givenName = <optional English-Firstname> < optional Arabic-FirstName>, surName = <optional English-Lastname> <optional Arabic-Lastname>, E = <emailaddress>, SN = <optional SerialNumber>, OU=<Medium Assurance >,OU=<optional RA Name>, OU=<optional Name of Customer Base>, OU=<optional Subject organization name>, O = STCS, C = SA".	V1 Field
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	Public Key Key length: 2048 (RSA)	V1 Field
SubjectAltName	RFC822 Name=<emailaddress> e.g.	No
CRL Distribution Points	[1]CRL Distribution Point Distribution Point Name: Full Name: URL=http://crl.sirar.com.sa/CRL/stcs_idca_stcs_sa_crlfile.crl	NO
Authority Key Identifier	keyIdentifier encoded in compliance to RFC 5280 The keyIdentifier should be composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey of the IDCA (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).	NO
Subject Key Identifier	keyIdentifier encoded in compliance to RFC 5280 The keyIdentifier should be composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).	NO
Certificate Policies	[1]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier =< 2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.22 > [1,1]Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: https://www.sirar.com.sa/repository  [2]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier =<2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.21.5.2>	NO

Field / x.509 extension	Value or Value Constant	Critical
Authority Information Access	[1]Authority Info Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) Alternative Name: URL=http://ocsp.sirar.com.sa [2]Authority Info Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2) Alternative Name: URL=http://crl.sirar.com.sa/certs/stcs_idca.crt	NO
Key Usage	digitalSignature, keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment	YES
EKU	clientAuth	NO

### High Assurance Identity Certificate

Field / x.509 extension	Value or Value Constant	Critical
Version	2 (Version 3)	V1 Field
SerialNumber	At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.	V1 Field
Signature	SHA256 with RSA Encryption	V1 Field
Issuer	CN = STCS IDCA O = STCS C = SA	V1 Field
NotBefore	Certificate generation process date/time.	V1 Field
NotAfter	Certificate generation process date/time + Up to 36 months (3 years)	V1 Field
Subject	"CN=<English-Firstname> <English-Secondname> <English-Thirdname> <English-Lastname> <Arabic-Lastname> <Arabic-Thirdname> <Arabic-SecondName> <Arabic-FirstName> <Organization Name>,givenName = <optional English-Firstname> <optional Arabic-FirstName>, surName = <optional English-Lastname> <optional Arabic-Lastname>, E = <emailaddress>, SN = <optional SerialNumber>, OU=<High Assurance >,OU=<optional RA Name>, OU=<optional Name of Customer Base>, OU=<optional Subject organization name>, O = STCS, C = SA".	V1 Field
SubjectPublic KeyInfo	Public Key Key length: 2048 (RSA)	V1 Field
CRL Distribution Points	e.g. [1]CRL Distribution Point Distribution Point Name: Full Name: URL=http://crl.sirar.com.sa/CRL/stcs_idca_stcs_sa_crlfile.crl	NO
Authority Key Identifier	keyIdentifier encoded in compliance to RFC 5280 The keyIdentifier should be composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey of the IDCA (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).	NO
Subject Key Identifier	keyIdentifier encoded in compliance to RFC 5280 The keyIdentifier should be composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).	NO
Certificate Policies	[1]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier =< 2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.22 >	NO

Field / x.509 extension	Value or Value Constant	Critical
	<p>[1]Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: <a href="https://www.sirar.com.sa/repository">https://www.sirar.com.sa/repository</a></p> <p>[2]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier =&lt;2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.21.5.3&gt;</p>	
Authority Information Access	<p>[1]Authority Info Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) Alternative Name: URL=<a href="http://ocsp.sirar.com.sa">http://ocsp.sirar.com.sa</a></p> <p>[2]Authority Info Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2) Alternative Name: URL=<a href="http://crl.sirar.com.sa/certs/stcs_idca.crt">http://crl.sirar.com.sa/certs/stcs_idca.crt</a></p>	NO
Key Usage	digitalSignature, keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment	YES
EKU	clientAuth	NO

### STCS IDCA RA Certificate Profile

Field / x.509 extension	Value or Value Constant	Critical
Version	2 (Version 3)	V1 Field
SerialNumber	At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.	V1 Field
Signature	SHA256 with RSA Encryption	V1 Field
Issuer	CN = STCS IDCA O = STCS C = SA	V1 Field
NotBefore	Certificate generation process date/time.	V1 Field
NotAfter	Certificate generation process date/time + Up to 36 months (3 years)	V1 Field
Subject	CN = <Organization name> OU = <Organization RA_id name> OU = <optional search bases> O = STCS C = SA	V1 Field
SubjectPublic KeyInfo	Public Key Key length: 2048 (RSA)	V1 Field
CRL Distribution Points	e.g. [1] CRL Distribution Point Distribution Point Name: Full Name: URL= <a href="http://crl.sirar.com.sa/CRL/stcs_idca_stcs_sa_crlfile.crl">http://crl.sirar.com.sa/CRL/stcs_idca_stcs_sa_crlfile.crl</a>	NO
Authority Key Identifier	keyIdentifier encoded in compliance to RFC 5280 The keyIdentifier should be composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey of the IDCA (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).	Yes
Subject Key Identifier	keyIdentifier encoded in compliance to RFC 5280 The keyIdentifier should be composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING <b>subjectPublicKey</b> (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).	NO

Field / x.509 extension	Value or Value Constant	Critical
Certificate Policies	[1]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=< <b>2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.22</b> > [1,1]Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: <a href="https://www.sirar.com.sa/repository">https://www.sirar.com.sa/repository</a>  [2]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=< <b>2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.21.6.1</b> >	NO
Authority Information Access	[1]Authority Info Access Access Method=On-line Certificate Status Protocol (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.1) Alternative Name: <a href="http://ocsp.sirar.com.sa/">http://ocsp.sirar.com.sa/</a> [2]Authority Info Access Access Method=Certification Authority Issuer (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48.2) Alternative Name: URL= <a href="http://crl.sirar.com.sa/certs/stcs_idca.crt">http://crl.sirar.com.sa/certs/stcs_idca.crt</a>	NO
Key Usage	Digital Signature, keyEncipherment	YES

### 7.1.1 VERSION NUMBERS

The IDCA shall issue X.509 v3 certificates (populate version field with integer "2").

### 7.1.2 CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS

X.509 v3 extensions are supported and used as indicated in the certificates profiles specified earlier in this section.

### 7.1.3 ALGORITHM OBJECT IDENTIFIERS

The IDCA shall sign Certificates using any one of the following:

**sha256WithRSAEncryption** algorithm (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11).

**sha384WithRSAEncryption** algorithm (1.2.840.113549.1.1.12).

### 7.1.4 NAME FORMS

Certificates issued by IDCA contain the full X.500 distinguished name of the certificate issuer and certificate subject in the issuer name and subject name fields. Distinguished names are in the form of an X.501 printable string.

### 7.1.5 NAME CONSTRAINTS

No Stipulation.

### **7.1.6 CERTIFICATE POLICY OBJECT IDENTIFIER**

Certificate policy object identifiers are used as an OID scheme specified for Sirar's PKI. Refer to section [7.1](#) of this CPS for the details of the contents of the certificates issued by the IDCA including the values of the OID identifiers.

### **7.1.7 USAGE OF POLICY CONSTRAINTS EXTENSION**

No Stipulation.

### **7.1.8 POLICY QUALIFIERS SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS**

No stipulation.

### **7.1.9 PROCESSING SEMANTICS FOR THE CRITICAL CERTIFICATE POLICY EXTENSION**

Processing semantics for the critical certificate policy extension shall conform to X.509 certification path processing rules.

## **7.2 CRL PROFILE**

The IDCA CRL Profile is shown below:

### **7.2.1 IDCA CRL PROFILE**

Field	Content	Comment
Version	1 (Version 2)	
Algorithm	SHA256withRSA	
Issuer	CN=STCS IDCA O=STCS C=SA	
This update	<issue date>	Date CRL was issued
Next update	<issue date + 1 day + 1 hour >	Or immediately upon revocation
AuthorityKeyIdentifier	The IDCA Subject Key Identifier	
CRL number	<number>	Integer that is incremented sequentially

### **7.2.2 VERSION NUMBERS**

The STCS IDCA shall issue X.509 version two (v2) CRLs (populate version field with integer "1").



### 7.2.3 CRL AND CRL ENTRY EXTENSIONS

Critical private extensions shall be interoperable in their intended community of use. CRLs shall have the CRL number and Authority Key Identify extensions set.

### 7.3 OCSP PROFILE

OCSP requests and responses shall be in accordance with RFC 6960.

The OCSP response signing certificate profile is as follows:

Field / x.509 extension	Value or Value Constant	Critical
Version	2 (Version 3)	V1 Field
SerialNumber	At least 64 bits of entropy validated on duplicates.	V1 Field
Signature	SHA256 with RSA Encryption	V1 Field
Issuer	CN = STCS IDCA O = STCS C = SA	V1 Field
NotBefore	Certificate generation process date/time.	V1 Field
NotAfter	Certificate generation process date/time + Up to 36 months (3 years)	V1 Field
Subject	CN = < OCSP Responder name> O = STCS C = SA	V1 Field
SubjectPublicKeyInfo	Public Key Key length: 2048 (RSA)	V1 Field
Authority Key Identifier	keyIdentifier encoded in compliance to RFC 5280 The keyIdentifier should be composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING subjectPublicKey of the IDCA (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).	NO
Subject Key Identifier	keyIdentifier encoded in compliance to RFC 5280 The keyIdentifier should be composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING <b>subjectPublicKey</b> (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits).	NO
Certificate Policies	[1]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=< <b>2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.22</b> > [1,1]Policy Qualifier Info: Policy Qualifier Id=CPS Qualifier: <a href="https://www.sirar.com.sa/repository">https://www.sirar.com.sa/repository</a>  [2]Certificate Policy: Policy Identifier=< <b>2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.21.6.2</b> >	NO
OCSP No Revocation Checking (id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck)		NO
Key Usage	digitalSignature, nonRepudiation	YES
Extended keyUsage	Id-kp-OCSPSigning	NO

### **7.3.1 *VERSION NUMBER***

The request shall use version 1 on the version request field (populated with integer 0)

### **7.3.2 *OCSP EXTENSIONS***

OCSP extensions shall comply with stipulations in RFC6960. The IDCA shall sign the OCSP responses itself. Thus, it will not be necessary to populate the id-kp-OCSPSigning extension.

## **8 COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS**

The PKI Committee shall be responsible for overseeing compliance of the IDCA to the CP and CPS. The PKI Committee shall ensure that the requirements of this CPS and the CP and the provisions of applicable Agreements with subscribers are implemented and enforced. The IDCA shall undergo annual WebTrust audits whose results shall be submitted to NCDC if requested.

The PKI Committee shall also ensure periodical audits (at least annually) to its RAs are conducted to ensure compliance with the RA agreements and provisions of the CP and this CPS.

### **8.1 FREQUENCY OF AUDIT OR ASSESSMENTS**

The IDCA shall be subjected to periodic WebTrust compliance audits which are no less frequent than once a year. Similarly, the Sirar's PKI Committee has the right to require periodic inspections of its RAs to validate that the RAs are operating in accordance with the CP/CPS and/or RA agreement. Sirar may internally audit each delegated third party's compliance against defined requirements on an annual basis.

### **8.2 IDENTITY AND QUALIFICATIONS OF ASSESSOR**

The annual audit of the IDCA shall be performed by a Qualified Auditor. A Qualified Auditor means a natural person, Legal Entity, or group of natural persons or Legal Entities that collectively possess the following qualifications and skills:

- Independence from the subject of the audit;
- The ability to conduct an audit that addresses the criteria specified in an Eligible Audit Scheme;
- Employs individuals who have proficiency in examining Public Key Infrastructure technology, information security tools and techniques, information technology and security auditing, and the third-party attestation function;
- Certified, accredited, licensed, or otherwise assessed as meeting the qualification requirements of auditors under the audit scheme; and
- Bound by law, government regulation, or professional code of ethics.

A licensed WebTrust auditor will be appointed by Sirar for the audit.

### **8.3 ASSESSOR'S RELATIONSHIP TO ASSESSED ENTITY**

To provide an unbiased and independent evaluation, the auditor and audited party shall not have any current or planned financial, legal or other relationship that could result in a conflict of interest.

### **8.4 TOPICS COVERED BY ASSESSMENT**

The IDCA is audited for compliance to the AICPA/CICA Trust Service Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities.

The auditor shall provide Sirar and/or NCDC with a compliance report highlighting any discrepancies.

## **8.5 ACTIONS TAKEN AS A RESULT OF DEFICIENCY**

If irregularities are found by the auditor, Sirar shall be informed in writing of the findings. Sirar shall submit a report to the auditor or directly to NCDC, as determined by NCDC, as to any remedial action Sirar will take in response to the identified deficiencies. This report shall include a time for completion to be approved by the auditor, or by NCDC as appropriate.

Where Sirar fails to take remedial action in response to the identified deficiencies, NCDC shall be informed by the auditor and shall take the appropriate action, according to the severity of the deficiencies.

## **8.6 COMMUNICATION OF RESULTS**

An Audit Compliance Report, including identification of corrective measures taken or being taken by Sirar, shall be provided to Sirar and/or NCDC as applicable.

Sirar shall make the Audit Report publicly available no later than three months after the end of the audit period. In the event of a delay greater than three months, an explanatory letter is to be signed by the Qualified Auditor.

## **9 OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS**

### **9.1 FEES**

#### **9.1.1 CERTIFICATE ISSUANCE/RENEWAL FEE**

Sirar may charge fees for certificate issuance or renewal. Fees may also be charged for certificate reissuance or re-key.

#### **9.1.2 CERTIFICATE ACCESS FEES**

Sirar may charge access fees at its discretion to any database which stores issued certificates.

#### **9.1.3 REVOCATION OR STATUS INFORMATION ACCESS FEE**

Sirar does not charge fees to access certificate status information via the CRL nor the OCSP responder.

#### **9.1.4 FEES FOR OTHER SERVICES**

Sirar may charge fees for other services such as timestamping.

#### **9.1.5 REFUND POLICY**

No stipulation.

### **9.2 FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY**

Sirar disclaims all liability implicit or explicit due to the use of any certificates issued by the Sirar's Issuing CAs which certify public keys of subscribers.

#### **9.2.1 INSURANCE COVERAGE**

Sirar shall hold insurance cover in lieu of its performance and obligations that is deemed sufficient by the IDCA:

- Commercial general liability insurance with policy limits as determined by Sirar;
- Professional Liability (Errors and Omissions) Insurance with policy limits as determined by Sirar

#### **9.2.2 OTHER ASSETS**

Sirar shall have sufficient financial resources to maintain their operations and perform their duties.

#### **9.2.3 INSURANCE/WARRANTY COVERAGE FOR END-ENTITIES**

No stipulation.

### **9.3 CONFIDENTIALITY OF BUSINESS INFORMATION**

Information pertaining to the IDCA may be made publicly available at the discretion of the PKI Committee. Specific confidentiality requirements for business information are defined in Sirar's Privacy Policy and the associated agreements.

#### **9.3.1 SCOPE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

##### **9.3.1.1 Registration Information**

All registration records are considered to be confidential information, including:

- Certificate applications, whether approved or not;
- Certificate information collected as part of the registration process;
- Completed Subscriber Agreements;
- Any corporate or personal information held by Sirar/RA related to the application and issuance of Certificates is considered confidential and will not be released without the prior consent of the relevant holder, unless required otherwise by law or to fulfill the requirements of CP, and in accordance with Sirar's Privacy Policy.

##### **9.3.1.2 Certificate Information**

The reasons for a certificate being revoked is considered confidential information, with the sole exception of the revocation of the IDCA due to:

- The compromise of their private key, in which case a disclosure may be made that the private key has been compromised; or
- The termination of the IDCA in which case prior disclosure of the termination may be given.

##### **9.3.1.3 PKI Documentation**

Sirar's Information Assets Classification & Control Policy specifies which documents are confidential.

#### **9.3.2 INFORMATION NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

##### **9.3.2.1 Certificate Information**

Certificates published in the public repositories are not considered to be confidential information.

##### **9.3.2.2 PKI Documentation**

The following documents are public documents and are not considered to be confidential information:

- The CP;
- The CPS;
- Any other policy documents which are classified public.

### **9.3.2.3      *Disclosure of Certificate Revocation Information***

Certificate revocation information is provided via the CRL in the repositories.

### **9.3.3      *RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION***

All Sirar's PKI participants shall be responsible for protecting the confidential information they possess in accordance with Sirar's Privacy Policy and applicable laws and Agreements.

## **9.4      *PRIVACY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION***

Any personal identifying information collected by the IDCA shall be protected in accordance with Sirar's Privacy Policy. Sirar shall use reasonable measures to protect personal identifying information from disclosure to any third party.

### **9.4.1      *PRIVACY PLAN***

All personally identifying information as defined by Sirar's Privacy Policy shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure.

### **9.4.2      *INFORMATION TREATED AS PRIVATE***

Any information about Subscribers that is not publicly available through the content of the issued certificate, repository and online CRL's is treated as private.

### **9.4.3      *INFORMATION NOT DEEMED PRIVATE***

Information appearing in Subscriber Certificates such as the organization name, and public key will not be deemed private. Sirar's Privacy Policy identifies the personally identifiable information that can be collected to enable issuance of a certificate.

### **9.4.4      *RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT PRIVATE INFORMATION***

Sirar's employees, suppliers and contractors handle personal information in strict confidence under the Sirar's contractual obligations that at least as protective as the terms specified in section [9.4.1](#).

### **9.4.5      *NOTICE AND CONSENT TO USE PRIVATE INFORMATION***

Requirements for notice and consent to use private information are defined in the respective Agreements and Sirar's Privacy Policy.

### **9.4.6      *DISCLOSURE PURSUANT TO JUDICIAL/ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS***

Any disclosure shall be handled in accordance with Sirar's Privacy Policy.

### **9.4.7      *OTHER INFORMATION DISCLOSURE CIRCUMSTANCES***

Any disclosure shall be handled in accordance with Sirar's Privacy Policy.

## **9.5 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS**

The allocation of Intellectual Property Rights among Sirar's participants are governed by the applicable agreements.

Sirar retains exclusive rights to any products or information developed under or pursuant to the CPS.

## **9.6 REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES**

### **9.6.1 CA REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES**

Sirar provides representations and warranties in accordance with the CP, this CPS, respective agreements and applicable laws and regulations as below:

- Providing the operational infrastructure and certification services;
- Making reasonable efforts to ensure it conducts an efficient and trustworthy operation. "Reasonable efforts" include but are not limited to operating in compliance with:
  - Documented CP and CPS;
  - Documented Sirar's Operations Policies and Procedures; and
  - Within applicable agreements, Saudi Law and regulations.
- At the time of Certificate issuance; Sirar's implemented procedures for verifying accuracy of the information contained within it before installation and first use;
- Implemented procedures for reducing the likelihood that the information contained in the Certificate is not misleading;
- Maintaining 24x7 publicly accessible repositories with current information and replicates the relevant certificate information as well as CRLs;
- For the CA's, the Hardware Security Modules (HSM's) used for key generation meet the requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 3 to store the CA keys and take reasonable precautions to prevent any loss, disclosure, or unauthorized use of the private key CA private key is generated using multi-person control "m-of-n" split key knowledge scheme;
- Backing up of the CA signing Private Key is under the same multi-person control as the original Signing Key;
- Keep confidential, any passwords, PINs or other personal secrets used in obtaining authenticated access to PKI facilities and maintain proper control procedures for all such personal secrets;
- Use its private signing key only to sign certificates and CRLs and for no other purpose;
- Perform authentication and identification procedures in accordance with applicable Agreement and Sirar's Operations Policies and Procedures;
- Provide certificate and key management services in accordance with the CP and CPS; and
- Ensure that CA personnel use private keys issued for the purpose of conducting CA duties only for such purposes.



### **9.6.2 RA REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES**

Sirar requires all RAs under its PKI Hierarchy to warrant that they are in compliance with the CP and may choose to include additional representations within this CPS or RA agreement.

### **9.6.3 RELYING PARTIES REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES**

Relying Parties who rely upon the certificates issued under Sirar's PKI shall:

- Use the certificate for the purpose for which it was issued, as indicated in the certificate information (e.g., the key usage extension);
- Verify the Validity by ensuring that the Certificate has not expired;
- Establish trust in the CA who issued a certificate by verifying the certificate path in accordance with the guidelines set by the X.509 Version 3 amendment;
- Ensure that the Certificate has not been revoked by accessing current revocation status information available at the location specified in the Certificate to be relied upon; and
- Determining that such Certificate provides adequate assurances for its intended use.

### **9.6.4 SUBSCRIBER REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES**

Subscribers are human individuals or organization entities to which certificates are issued.

1. It is the responsibility of the Subscriber to:
  - Always provide accurate and complete information to the CA/RA, both in the certificate request and verification process defined by the IDCA/RA for specific Certificate type to be issued by the IDCA;
  - Review and verify the Certificate contents for accuracy;
  - Secure private key and take reasonable and necessary precautions to prevent loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of the private key. This includes password, hardware token, or other activation data that is used to control access to the Subscriber's private key;
  - Use the Subscriber Certificate only for its intended uses as specified in the CP and this CPS;
  - Notify the IDCA/RA in the event that any information in the Certificate is, or becomes, incorrect or inaccurate;
  - Notify the IDCA/RA in the event of a key compromise immediately whenever the Subscriber has reason to believe that the Subscriber's private key has been lost, accessed by another individual, or compromised in any other manner;
  - Use the Subscriber Certificate in a manner that does not violate applicable laws in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; and
  - Upon termination of Subscriber Agreement, revocation or expiration of the Subscriber Certificate, immediately cease use of Private Key corresponding to the Public Key included in the Subscriber Certificate.
2. Subscriber agrees that any use of the Subscriber Certificate to sign or otherwise approve the contents of any electronic record or message is attributable to Subscriber. Subscriber agrees to be legally bound by the contents of any such electronic record or message.

3. Subscriber shall indemnify and hold Sirar (the CA) or RA acting on behalf of the Sirar, harmless from and against any and all damages (including legal fees), losses, lawsuits, claims or actions arising out of:
- Use of Subscriber's Certificate in an unauthorized manner or otherwise inconsistent with the terms of the Subscriber Agreement or this CPS and the CP;
  - A Subscriber Certificate being tampered with by the Subscriber; or
  - Inaccuracies or misrepresentations contained within the Application. A Subscriber shall indemnify and hold the IDCA/RA harmless against any damages and legal fees that arise out of lawsuits, claims or actions by third parties who rely on or otherwise use Subscriber's Certificate, where such lawsuit, claim, or action relates to a Subscriber's breach of its obligations outlined in this CPS, the CP or the Subscriber Agreement, a Subscriber's use of or reliance upon a Subscriber Certificate in connection with its business operations, a Subscriber's failure to protect its private key, or claims pertaining to content or other information or data supplied, or required to be supplied, by Subscriber.

## **9.7 DISCLAIMERS OF WARRANTIES**

Sirar, through its associated components, seeks to provide digital certification services according to international standards and best practices, using the most secure physical and electronic installations.

Sirar provides no warranty, express, or implied, statutory or otherwise and disclaims any and all liability for the success or failure of the deployment of the IDCA or for the legal validity, acceptance or any other type of recognition of its own certificates, those issued by it, any digital signature backed by such certificates, and any products provided by Sirar. Sirar further disclaims any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose of the above-mentioned certificates, digital signatures and products.

## **9.8 LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY**

Limitations on Liability:

- Sirar will not incur any liability to any person to the extent that such liability results from their negligence, fraud or willful misconduct;
- Sirar assumes no liability whatsoever in relation to the use of Certificates or associated Public-Key/Private-Key pairs issued under Certificate Policy for any use other than in accordance with Certificate Policy. Relying Parties will immediately indemnify Sirar from and against any such liability and costs and claims arising there from;
- Sirar will not be liable to any party whosoever for any damages suffered whether directly or indirectly as a result of an uncontrollable disruption of its services;
- Relying Parties shall bear the consequences of their failure to perform the Relying Party obligations described in the Relying Party agreement;
- Sirar denies any financial or any other kind of responsibility for damages or impairments resulting from its CA operation.

## **9.9 INDEMNITIES**

No stipulation.

## **9.10 TERM AND TERMINATION**

### **9.10.1 TERM**

This CPS shall be effective upon approval by the PKI Committee. The NCDC shall be notified of all changes to this document. Once the CPS becomes effective it is published in the repository. Amendments to this CPS upon approval become effective and replace the older version in the repository.

### **9.10.2 TERMINATION**

This CPS as amended from time to time shall remain in force until it is replaced by a new version. The latest version of this CPS can be found at: <https://sirar.com.sa/repository/>.

### **9.10.3 EFFECT OF TERMINATION AND SURVIVAL**

Upon termination of this CPS, all IDCA participants are nevertheless bound by its terms for all certificates issued for the remainder of the validity periods of such certificates.

## **9.11 INDIVIDUAL NOTICES AND COMMUNICATIONS WITH PARTICIPANTS**

All communication between NCDC, Saudi National Root CA, and Sirar, the IDCA shall be in writing or via digitally signed communication. If in writing, the communication shall be signed on the appropriate organization letterhead. If electronically, a Digital Signature shall be made using a Private Key whose companion Public Key is certified using a Certificate meeting this CPS's Certificate assurance level.

## **9.12 AMENDMENTS**

### **9.12.1 PROCEDURE FOR AMENDMENT**

This CPS shall be reviewed at least once a year by the PKI Committee. Major amendments shall be discussed with the NCDC. The final agreed amendments are approved and applied by the PKI Committee.

Sirar reserves the right to change this CPS from time to time. Sirar will incorporate any such change into a new version of this CPS and, upon approval, publish the new version. The new CPS will carry a new version number.

### **9.12.2 NOTIFICATION MECHANISM AND PERIOD**

This CPS and any subsequent changes shall be made available to the IDCA participants within two weeks of approval. Sirar reserves the right to amend this CPS without notification for amendments that are not material, including without limitation corrections of typographical errors, changes to URL's, and changes to contact information. All Sirar's PKI participants and other parties designated by Sirar shall provide their comments to the PKI Committee in accordance with its rules. The PKI Committee's decision to designate amendments as material or non-material shall be at PKI Committee's sole discretion.

**9.12.3 CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH OID MUST BE CHANGED**

The policy OID shall only change if the change in the CPS results in a material change to the trust by the relying parties, as determined by Sirar.

**9.13 DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES**

The use of certificates issued by the IDCA is governed by contracts, agreements, and standards set forth by Sirar. Those contracts, agreements and standards include dispute resolution policy and procedures that shall be employed in any dispute arising from the issuance or use of a certificate governed by this CPS. Dispute Resolution mechanism is described in Sirar's Dispute Resolution Policy.

**9.14 GOVERNING LAW**

This CPS is governed by the laws of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

**9.15 COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW**

This CPS is subject to applicable national, local and foreign laws, rules, regulations, ordinances, decrees, and orders including, but not limited to, restrictions on exporting or importing software, hardware, or technical information.

**9.16 MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS****9.16.1 ENTIRE AGREEMENT**

No stipulation.

**9.16.2 ASSIGNMENT**

Except where specified by other contracts, no party may assign or delegate this CPS or any of its rights or duties under this CPS, without the prior written consent of Sirar.

**9.16.3 SEVERABILITY**

Should it be determined that one section of this CPS is incorrect or invalid, the other sections of this CPS shall remain in effect until the CPS is updated. The process for updating this CPS is described in section [9.12](#).

**9.16.4 ENFORCEMENT (ATTORNEY FEES/WAIVER OF RIGHTS)**

This document shall be treated according to laws of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Legal disputes arising from the operation of the IDCA will be treated according to laws of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

**9.16.5 FORCE MAJEURE**

Sirar shall not be liable for any failure or delay in its performance under this CPS due to causes that are beyond its reasonable control, including, but not limited to, an act of God, act of civil

or military authority, fire, epidemic, flood, earthquake, riot, war, failure of equipment, failure of telecommunications lines, lack of Internet access, sabotage, and reasons beyond provisions of the governing law.

## **9.17 OTHER PROVISIONS**

### **9.17.1 *FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS***

Nothing contained in this CPS shall be deemed to constitute either Sirar, or any of its subcontractors, agents, officers, suppliers, employees, partners, principals, or directors to be a partner, Affiliate, trustee, of any Relying Party or any third party, or to create any fiduciary relationship between Sirar and any Relying party, or any third party, for any purpose whatsoever.

Nothing in this CPS or any Agreement between a third party and a Relying Party shall confer on any Customer, Relying Party, Applicant or any third party, any authority to act for, bind, or create or assume any obligation or responsibility, or make any representation on behalf of Sirar.

### **9.17.2 *ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES***

Administrative process shall be specified in corresponding agreements and any Sirar's Operational policies.

## APPENDIX-A: CERTIFICATE TYPES

### A.1 CERTIFICATE TYPES SUPPORTED

#### A1.1 DIGITAL IDENTITY CERTIFICATE SERVICE (IDS)

##### A.1.1.1 Digital Identity Certificate issuance requirements and Usage: MEDIUM Assurance Certificate (MAC)

S. No.	Attribute	Digital Identity Certificate
1	Policy Name	Sirar Medium Assurance Digital Identity Certificate Policy
2	Policy OID	<b>2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.21.5.2</b>
3	Application Usage	<p>Sirar Digital Identity Certificates are subscriber certificates intended to identify or authenticate subscribers (human subscribers or organizations). They are issued under the STCS Identity CA (IDCA). These Digital Identity certificates comply with the requirements of <b>Medium Assurance Level</b> certificates as per Saudi National PKI Policy. These certificates are general purpose certificates that are not tied to any specific application or function. The applications using the IDCA issued Digital Identity Certificates should honour Key Usage set in the certificates</p> <p>The Digital Identification certificate may also be used for other general or specific IDCA purposes which are not covered explicitly above, provided that a Relying Party is able to reasonably rely on that certificate and the usage is as per the IDCA practices, Subscribers agreement and not otherwise prohibited by law of Saudi Arabia.</p> <p>Medium Assurance Certificates can be issued to Natural Persons or Legal Persons (Organizations)</p>
4	Verification Process	<p><b>A) Natural Persons</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subscriber provide shall provide government issued identity document</li> <li>Check that the subscriber is the sole claimant of the identity</li> <li>IDCA/RA to check the existence of the email address supplied and that the subscriber has control over it</li> <li>IDCA/RA to check the government issued identity document and verify against authoritative sources for validity</li> <li>A binding of the claimed identity shall be performed by checking the link between the claimed identity and the provided documents</li> </ul> <p><b>B) Legal Persons (Organizations)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Company or legal documents from a company registration authority shall be provided and verified</li> <li>Identity document of the applicant and the authorization that confirms the permission to apply the certificate on behalf of the organization to be provided, and that the applicant is a member of the organization</li> <li>IDCA/RA shall verify the existence of the email address provided and that the subscriber/applicant has control over the email address</li> <li>IDCA/RA shall verify the existence of the organization by using a public register</li> </ul>
5	Key Pair Generation and Installation	<p>Key Pair generation must be performed using trustworthy systems and processes that provide the required cryptographic strength of the generated keys, and prevent the loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of such keys.</p> <p>Subscriber may use Hardware Security device like smart card / tokens for key generation and storage. Software generated keys are also supported, provided the process complies with the requirements of FIPS 186.</p>

S. No.	Attribute	Digital Identity Certificate
		<p><b>If generated in Cryptographic device, the device must be certified to at least FIPS 140-2 Level 2 .</b></p> <p>In addition, the Subscriber shall acknowledge receipt of the private key(s).</p>
6	Certificate Issuance Process	<p>Certificates shall only be issued to Saudi nationals or residents of the Kingdom as per the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Subscriber will be present at the IDCA/RA for face-to-face identity verification or an equivalent electronic identity verification process</li> <li>• The IDCA/RA will validate the documents submitted by the subscriber</li> <li>• The IDCA/RA will complete the registration and will issue a reference number and an authentication code to the subscriber in a secured manner.</li> <li>• The subscriber will go to the IDCA/RA service centre (or remotely for software generated keys)</li> <li>• The Subscriber will plug his smart card / USB token into the customization device.</li> <li>• The Subscriber will enter the PIN of the smart card / USB token</li> <li>• The Subscriber will enter reference number and an authorization code to generate keys and download certificates.</li> <li>• The Client Software will generate the Subscriber's keys securely on his smart card / USB token.</li> <li>• The IDCA/RA will authenticate the Subscriber using the reference number and authorization code and receive the certificate signing request using a secure protocol such as PKIX-CMP. Upon successful authentication, the IDCA/RA shall request for the creating of the Subscribers certificates and transport them securely onto the Subscriber's smart cards / USB tokens once approved by the CA.</li> </ul> <p><b>Software generated keys shall follow the same process, except there will be no cryptographic device for key generation or storage. Instead the certificate shall be made available via a PKCS#12 formatted file.</b></p>
7	Private Key Protection	<p>For keys generated in Software, Subscribers shall protect the password that unlocks the private key.</p> <p>For keys generated in Cryptographic devices, Subscribers shall protect their private keys in a FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher certified smart card or other hardware token/module. A Subscriber is obligated to secure the private key and take reasonable and necessary precautions to prevent loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of the private key. This includes password, hardware token, or other activation data that is used to control access to the Subscriber's private key.</p> <p>Generation and/or Storage of the authentication private keys shall only be done in FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher certified hardware.</p>
8	Certificate Re-key	<p>Certificate re-key may happen while the certificate is still active, after it has expired, or after a revocation. The re-key operation shall invalidate any existing active certificates of the same type.</p> <p>Verification of the subscriber's identity shall be performed in the same manner as during the initial registration, in addition to the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requests for certificates to be re-keyed is coming through the same email.</li> <li>• Check the existence and validity of the certificate to be rekeyed and that the information used to verify the identity and attributes of the subject are still valid.</li> <li>• If any of Sirar terms and conditions has changed, these shall be communicated to the subscriber and agreed to in accordance with requirements stated in the Saudi National PKI Policy and the present document.</li> </ul>

### A.1.1.2 Digital Identity Certificate issuance requirements And Usage: HIGH Assurance Certificate (HAC)

S. No.	Attribute	Digital Identity Certificate
1	Policy Name	Sirar Digital Identity Certificate Policy
2	Policy OID	<b>2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.21.5.3</b>
3	Application Usage	<p>Sirar Digital Identity Certificates are subscriber certificates intended to identify or authenticate subscribers. They are issued under the STCS Identity CA (IDCA). These Digital Identity certificates comply with the requirements of <b>High Assurance Level</b> certificates as per Saudi National PKI Policy. These certificates are general purpose certificates that are not tied to any specific application or function. The applications using the IDCA issued Digital Identity Certificates should honour Key Usage set in the certificates</p> <p>The Digital Identification certificate may also be used for other general or specific IDCA purposes which are not covered explicitly above, provided that a Relying Party is able to reasonably rely on that certificate and the usage is as per the IDCA practices, Subscribers agreement and not otherwise prohibited by law of Saudi Arabia.</p>
4	Verification Process	<p><b>C) Natural Persons</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subscriber provide shall provide government issued identity document</li> <li>Check that the subscriber is the sole claimant of the identity</li> <li>A secondary feature such as a Biometric of the applicant shall be used</li> <li>IDCA/RA to check the existence of the email address supplied and that the subscriber has control over it</li> <li>IDCA/RA to check the government issued identity document and verify against authoritative sources for validity</li> <li>A binding of the claimed identity shall be performed by checking the link between the claimed identity and the provided documents</li> </ul> <p><b>D) Legal Persons (Organizations)</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Company or legal documents from a company registration authority shall be provided and verified</li> <li>Identity document of the applicant and the authorization that confirms the permission to apply the certificate on behalf of the organization to be provided, and that the applicant is a member of the organization</li> <li>IDCA/RA shall verify the existence of the email address provided and that the subscriber/applicant has control over the email address</li> <li>IDCA/RA shall verify the existence of the organization by using a public register</li> </ul>
5	Key Pair Generation and Installation	<p>Key Pair generation must be performed using trustworthy systems and processes that provide the required cryptographic strength of the generated keys, and prevent the loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of such keys, subscriber shall use Hardware Security device like smart card / tokens for key generation and storage.</p> <p><b>Keys for High Level Assurance certificates MUST be generated and stored on the secured hardware meeting the minimum requirements as mentioned in the IDCA CP.</b></p> <p>The Digital Identification Private keys must be generated and stored on FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher certified hardware token or smart card, and the IDCA/RA shall not retain any copy of the subscriber Private Keys. In addition, the Subscriber shall acknowledge receipt of the private key(s).</p>
6	Certificate Issuance Process	<p>Certificates shall only be issued to Saudi nationals or residents of the Kingdom as per the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Subscriber will be present at the IDCA/RA for face-to-face identity verification or an equivalent electronic identity verification process</li> <li>The IDCA/RA will validate the documents submitted by the subscriber</li> <li>The IDCA/RA will complete the registration and will issue a reference number and an authentication code to the subscriber in a secured manner.</li> <li>The subscriber will go to the IDCA/RA customization center</li> </ul>



S. No.	Attribute	Digital Identity Certificate
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Subscriber will plug his smart card / USB token into the customization device.</li> <li>The Subscriber will enter the PIN of the smart card / USB token</li> <li>The Subscriber will enter reference number and an authorization code to generate keys and download certificates.</li> <li>The Client Software will generate the Subscriber's keys securely on his smart card / USB token.</li> <li>The IDCA/RA will authenticate the Subscriber using the reference number and authorization code and receive the certificate signing request using a secure protocol such as PKIX-CMP. Upon successful authentication, the IDCA/RA shall submit the request for certificate to the CA, which shall in turn sign the request and issue the Subscribers' certificates and transport them securely onto the Subscriber's smart cards / USB tokens.</li> </ul>
7	Private Key Protection	Subscribers shall protect their private keys in a FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher certified smart card or other hardware token/module. Subscriber is obligated to secure the private key and take reasonable and necessary precautions to prevent loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of the private key. This includes password, hardware token, or other activation data that is used to control access to the Subscriber's private key. Generation and/or Storage of name authentication private keys shall only be done in FIPS 140-2 Level 2 or higher certified hardware.
8	Certificate Re-key	Certificate re-key may happen while the certificate is still active, after it has expired, or after a revocation. The re-key operation shall invalidate any existing active certificates of the same type. Verification of the subscriber's identity shall be performed in the same manner as during the initial registration, in addition to the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Requests for certificates to be re-keyed is coming through the same email.</li> <li>Check the existence and validity of the certificate to be rekeyed and that the information used to verify the identity and attributes of the subject are still valid.</li> <li>If any of Sirar terms and conditions has changed, these shall be communicated to the subscriber and agreed to in accordance with requirements stated in the Saudi National PKI Policy and the present document.</li> </ul>

### A.1.2 RA IDENTITY CERTIFICATE (RA CERTIFICATE)

This is the Registration Authority (RA) Certificate Issued by the IDCA. The RA certificate is used to authenticate RA application requests to the CA if so implemented.

#### A.1.2.1 RA Certificate issuance requirements And Usage

S. No.	Attribute	RA Certificate
1	Policy Name	IDCA RA Identity Certificate Policy
2	Policy OID	<b>2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.21.6.1</b>
3	Application Usage	<p>IDCA RA Certificates are RA Identity Certificates. They are specifically issued to identify and authenticate RA requests to the CA, such as requesting subscriber certificates. They will be used by the RA applications that are authorized to manage subscribers and the corresponding lifecycle of their certificates. The RA applications using the IDCA issued RA Certificate should honour the Key Usage and any Extensions set in the certificate.</p> <p>The RA certificates shall comply with the requirements for a <b>Medium (or Substantial)</b> Level of Assurance (LoA) as described in the Saudi National PKI Policy.</p>

4	Verification Process	<p>The process of verifying Sirar RA Identity certificate request is done as part of the RA Take on process or contract renewal process. The following process shall apply:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Request for an RA certificate shall be requested by the PKI Committee or authorized RA representative</li> <li>• The request shall be accompanied by a signed RA Agreement.</li> <li>• The request shall also be accompanied by documented evidence of the RA approval</li> <li>• The Identity of the requesting party shall be verified. If the applicant is an external party, the applicant shall produce a government issued identity document.</li> </ul>
5	Key Pair Generation and Installation	<p>Keypair generation must be performed using trustworthy systems and processes that provide the required cryptographic strength of the generated keys, and prevent the loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of such keys.</p> <p>Where Cryptographic devices are used, Sirar RA Keypairs shall be generated using devices meeting the stipulated FIPS 140-2 Level.</p>
6	Certificate Issuance Process	<p>The certificate is issued as part of the Key Ceremony Process</p> <p>A signed PKCS#10 formatted CSR is provided to the IDCA that shall in turn sign the request.</p> <p>The signed certificate shall be returned to complete the process of the STCS IDCA configuration</p>
7	Private Key Protection	Sirar RA Certificate Private Keys shall be protected using a Hardware Security Module meeting FIPS140-2 Level 2 requirements.
8	Certificate Re-key	<p>Certificate re-key may happen while the certificate is still active, after it has expired, or after a revocation. The re-key operation shall invalidate any existing active certificates of the same type.</p> <p>Verification of the subscriber's identity shall be performed in the same manner as during the initial registration, in addition to the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requests for certificates to be re-keyed is coming through the same email.</li> <li>• Check the existence and validity of the certificate to be rekeyed and that the information used to verify the identity and attributes of the subject are still valid.</li> <li>• If any of Sirar terms and conditions has changed, these shall be communicated to the subscriber and agreed to in accordance with requirements stated in the Saudi National PKI Policy and the present document.</li> </ul>

### A.1.3 ONLINE CERTIFICATE STATUS PROTOCOL CERTIFICATE (OCSP CERTIFICATE)

The OCSP certificate is issued to the OCSP responder service. The certificate is used to sign OCSP requests.

#### A.1.3.1 OCSP Certificate issuance requirements And Usage

S. No.	Attribute	RA Certificate
1	Policy Name	IDCA OCSP Certificate Policy
2	Policy OID	<b>2.16.682.1.101.5000.1.4.1.2.1.21.6.2</b>
3	Application Usage	<p>IDCA OCSP Certificates are used for signing of OCSP responses. They are specifically issued to sign responses from an OCSP responder service. The OCSP Responder applications using the IDCA issued OCSP Certificate should honour the Key Usage and any Extensions set in the certificate.</p> <p>The OCSP certificates shall comply with the requirements for a <b>Medium (or Substantial)</b> Level of Assurance (LoA) as described in the Saudi National PKI Policy.</p>
4	Verification Process	The process of verifying Sirar OCSP certificate request is done as part of setting up the CA services (immediately after a Key Ceremony). The following process shall apply:

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The Request for the OCSP certificate shall be requested by the PKI Committee or authorized CA representative</li><li>• The request shall be accompanied by documented evidence of the OCSP Responder service approval</li><li>• The Identity of the requesting party shall be verified.</li></ul>
5	Key Pair Generation and Installation	<p>Keypair generation must be performed using trustworthy systems and processes that provide the required cryptographic strength of the generated keys, and prevent the loss, disclosure, modification, or unauthorized use of such keys.</p> <p>Where Cryptographic devices are used, Sirar RA Keypairs shall be generated using devices meeting the stipulated FIPS 140-2 Level.</p>
6	Certificate Issuance Process	<p>A signed PKCS#10 formatted CSR is provided to the IDCA that shall in turn sign the request.</p> <p>The signed certificate shall be returned to complete the process of the IDCA OCSP Responder configuration</p>
7	Private Key Protection	<p>The IDCA OCSP Certificate Private Keys shall be protected using a Hardware Security Module meeting FIPS140-2 Level 2 requirements.</p>
8	Certificate Re-key	<p>Certificate re-key may happen while the certificate is still active or after it has expired.</p> <p>The routine re-key of the OCSP certificates is done according Sirar's internal Operations Policies and Procedures.</p>